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INTRODUCTION
The current United States-Mexico dispute before the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") involves a Mexican tax measure which
imposes a twenty-percent tax on soft drinks, beverages, and syrups
using sweeteners other than cane sugar ("HFCS tax").' Beginning in
1. See Ley del Impuesto Sobre Produccion Y Servicios [Law on the Special
Tax on Production and Services], art. 2, D.O., 12 de enero de 2004 (Mex.)
[hereinafter HFCS Tax] (describing the Mexican tax measures and their
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the 1970s, U.S. manufacturers developed High Fructose Corn Syrup
("HFCS"), a corn-based sweetener, as a low cost sugar substitute for
use in the food and soft drink industry.2 Since the 1980s, HFCS has
been the principal sweetener in the U.S. soft drink market.3
Beginning in the 1990s, Mexico also used HFCS as a major
sweetener in its soft drink industry,4 and by 2001 HFCS comprised
thirty percent of the Mexican soft drink market share.5 The HCFS tax
applicability to soft drinks and syrups using sweeteners other than cane sugar),
available at http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/pdf/78.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2005); see also Reformas y adiciones a la Ley del Impuesto Especial sobre
Produccion y Servicios, DECIDIR Mexico (Dec. 1, 2004) (presenting the latest
amendment to the Mexican tax measures effective January 1, 2005), available at
http://www.decidir.com.mx/noticias.asp?idpnews=9951 &tema=POGOAF (last
visited Apr. 5, 2005); Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States,
WT/DS308/4, at 1 (June 11, 2004) [hereinafter Mexico, Panel Request] (providing
a brief overview of the dispute and a discussion of the Mexican tax measures),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispustatuse.htm#200 4 (last visited
Apr. 5, 2005).
2. See CORN REFINERS ASS'N, CORN ANNUAL 2000: HISTORY OF CORN
REFINING IN THE U.S. (2002) (suggesting that the improvement of HFCS
technology led to the creation of HFCS-55, a primary sweetener in the U.S. soft
drink industry), available at http://www.com.org/web/cachpt2-1.htm (last visited
Apr. 5, 2005).
3. See WILLIAM MOORE, TRENDS IN U.S. SOFT DRINK CONSUMPTION -
DEMAND IMPLICATIONS FOR LoW-CALORIE AND OTHER SWEETENERS - U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, in SITUATION & OUTLOOK
REPORT: SUGAR & SWEETENER (1991) (describing the increasing trends in HFCS
consumption in the United States), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mim3796/is_1991_Sept/ail 1917708/print
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
4. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States
Requests WTO Panel Against Mexico Over Beverage Taxes (June 22, 2004)
[hereinafter Press Release on Beverage Taxes] (asserting that the Mexican bottling
industry began to substitute HFCS for cane sugar), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Press Releases/2004/June/U.S._Requests
_WTOPanelAgainstMexico OverBeverageTaxes.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2005).
5. See Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, First
Submission of the United States of America, WT/DS308, 35 (Sept. 30, 2004)
[hereinafter U.S. First Submission] (noting that prior to the introduction of HFCS,
cane sugar was the dominant nutritive sweetener in Mexico), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute-
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dispute is particularly significant to U.S. manufacturers because
Mexicans are the second largest per-capita soft drink consumers in
the world6 and the largest per-capita consumers of Coca-Cola.7
Overall, Mexicans consume over 15 billion liters of soft drinks
annually.8
The current dispute began in 1998, when Mexico imposed anti-
dumping duties on U.S. HFCS imports.9 In January 2000, the WTO
SettlementlWTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset upload file565_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
6. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, EXECUTIVE BRIEFING MEXICO,
MEXICO: FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO BACKGROUND 4 (2004) (explaining that
foreign companies dominate the Mexican soft drink market), available at 2004
WLNR 14004998. See generally Sins of the Fleshy, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 16,
2004, at 1-2 (discussing that fizzy drinks, beans, tortillas, and meat have led to an
obesity and diabetes epidemic in Mexico).
7. See Kevin Pang, Mexican Coke a Hit in the U.S.: A Taste of Home
Aficionados Say It's the Cane Sugar, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A2
(discussing that Mexicans consumed 55.2 billion cans of Coca-Cola products last
year which equals about 526 servings per person), available at 2004 WLNR
4020352. By comparison, Americans consumed 414 servings of Coke last year.
Id.; see also Mexico Mulls Soft Drink Tax, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2001 [hereinafter
Soft Drink Tax] (stating that "[i]n other countries people refresh themselves with a
Coca-Cola . [b]ut in Mexico they eat Coca-Cola"), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1661200.stm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005);
FOMENTO ECONOMICO MEXICANO, S.A. DE C.V. ("FEMSA"), ANNUAL REPORT
2003: NEW HORIZONS 16 (2003) (asserting that Mexico comprises the largest
market share of Coca-Cola), available at
http://www.femsa.con/informe2003/FMX-EnglishO3AR.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2005).
8. See GRUPO CONTINENTAL, S.A., ANNUAL REPORT 2001 16-19 (2001)
[hereinafter CONTINENTAL REPORT] (detailing the sales volume, per-capita
consumption, market share, and distribution networks of the Mexican soft drink
industry), available at http://www.contal.com/report01.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2005); see also Big Cola Close to 5% of Market, EL FINANCIERO (Mexico), July
21, 2003, at 27 (stating that Coca-Cola and Pepsi make up seventy percent of
Mexico's soft drink industry which has a value of twelve billion dollars), available
at 2003 WLNR 256723.
9. See REMY JURENAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF
1B95117, SUGAR POLICY ISSUES (2001) (stating that "[i]n January and September
1998, following two additional investigations, Mexico imposed fmal anti-dumping
duties on imports of three HFCS products from four U.S. companies"), available
at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Agriculture/ag-
27.cfin?&CFID=1575435&CFTOKEN=66313909#_1_27 (last visited Apr. 5,
2005).
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Panel ruled that these duties were inconsistent with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").'" Similarly, the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")" dispute resolution
panel found that Mexico's anti-dumping actions were inconsistent
with NAFTA.2 In August 2000, prior to both the NAFTA and WTO
rulings, Mexico requested a dispute resolution panel to interpret
10. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/gatt47.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") was established on April 15, 1994.
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter GATT 1994], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/finale.htm See Mexico-Antidumping
Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, Report
of the Panel, WT/DS132/R, 8.2 (Jan. 28, 2000) (finding that Mexico
inadequately considered the impact of U.S. imports on its domestic industry as
well as the threat of material injury to the Mexican sugar industry), available at
2000 WTO DS LEXIS 1; see also Mexico-Antidumping Investigation of High
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS132/RW, 135 (Oct. 22, 2001) (holding that Mexico failed to
implement the Panel's original recommendations and ordering Mexico to conform
to the obligations of GATT), available at 2001 WTO DS LEXIS 29; GATT, art.
VI (discussing the anti-dumping principles and dispute settlement mechanisms
governing the trade relationships among member-states).
11. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (pts.
1-3); 32 I.L.M. 605 (pts. 4-8) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
12. See Review of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation
on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, Originating from the United States of
America, Case: MEX-USA-98-1904-01, $T 112-13 (Aug. 3, 2001) [hereinafter
NAFTA Corn Syrup I] (determining that the Investigating Authority failed to find
a threat of injury to Mexico's domestic sugar industry), available at
http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTAChapter_ 19/Mexico/ma9
8010e.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005); see also Review of the Final Determination
of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup,
Originating from the United States of America, Case: MEX-USA-98-1904-01, 23
(Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter NAFTA Corn Syrup II] (holding that after multiple
investigations and reconsiderations, the Investigating Authority failed to
demonstrate to the Panel that HFCS imports from the United States pose a threat of
injury to Mexico's domestic sugar market, and concluding that the anti-dumping
duties violated international provisions and laws), available at http://www.nafta-
sec-
alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTAChapter_ 19/Mexico/ma9
801 le.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
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whether the United States was violating its NAFTA obligations by
limiting Mexico's access to the U.S. sugar market. 3 In January 2002,
Mexico imposed a twenty-percent tax on soft drinks made with
sweeteners other than cane sugar. 14
In June 2004, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative asked
the WTO to establish a dispute settlement panel and challenge
Mexico's tax measures. 5 The United States claims that Mexico's
HFCS tax is inconsistent with the national treatment provisions
under Article 111:2 and Article 111:4 of the GATT. 6 Mexico does not
13. See USTR Challenges Mexican HFCS Tax in WTO with Corn Refiners
Support, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 19, 2004, at 7-8 [hereinafter USTR Challenges]
(noting that the case hinges on a side letter to the original NAFTA, submitted by
the United States to Congress as part of the implementing bill, limiting Mexico's
access to the U.S. sugar market). Mexico contends that it never signed the side
letter agreement. Id.
14. See Elisabeth Malkin, In Mexico, Sugar vs. U.S. Corn Syrup, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2004, at WI (explaining that Mexico imposed the soft drink tax as a
response from the U.S. failure to accept its surplus sugar imports replaced by
HFCS), available at 2004 WLNR 5417601; see also Soft Drink Tax, supra note 7
(asserting that Mexico imposed the twenty-percent beverage tax to reform its
struggling tax system). The United States and Mexico engaged in discussions
relating to the soft drink tax, but they failed to arrive at a resolution. Id.
15. See Press Release on Beverage Taxes, supra note 4 (contending that
Mexico's soft drink tax violates WTO rules by discriminating against U.S. HFCS
products and severely restricting U.S. exports of corn based sweeteners); see also
Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Constitution of the
Panel Established at the Request of the United States, Note by the Secretariat,
Revision, WT/DS308/5/Rev.1, 1 (Aug. 25, 2004) (establishing the Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") in accordance with Article 6 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU")), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu~e/distpu.status-e.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2005).
16. See Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Request
for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS308/1 (Mar. 18, 2004) (providing
background to the soft drink dispute), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/dispu-status e.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2005); see generally Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, Answers of the United States to Questions of the Panel in Relation to
the First Substantive Meeting with the Parties, WT/DS308, (Dec. 20, 2004)
[hereinafter U.S. Answers I] (presenting the first U.S. response to questions from
the WTO Panel), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Monitoring-EnforcementDispute-
Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset~uploadfile 169_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005); Press Release, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Fin., Grassley
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contest the Article III allegations, and instead argues that the HFCS
tax falls within the Article XX(d) exception. 7 The Mexican
government also requests that the WTO panel decline jurisdiction
over the dispute and remove the case to a NAFTA panel.I8
This Comment explores whether the HFCS tax violates Article
111:2 and/or Article 111:4, and whether the HFCS tax is justified under
the Article XX(d) exception. 9 Part I explains the relevant provisions
in Article III and Article XX 20 and discusses previous Article III and
Article XX jurisprudence.2' Part I also provides background on the
Urges President Bush to Raise Corn Syrup Dispute With Mexican President (Mar.
22, 2005) (requesting that President Bush discuss the HFCS dispute with the
Mexican President Vicente Fox at the leaders' meeting), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/press/Gpress/2005/prgO32205.pdf (last visited
Apr. 9, 2005).
17. See Mexico Argues HFCS Dispute Should Be Settled in NAFTA, Not WTO,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 5, 2004, at 15 [hereinafter Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO]
(claiming that its tax measures are justified to secure compliance with NAFTA);
see also Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Second
Submission of the United States of America, WT/DS308 (Jan. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter U.S. Second Submission] (repeating Mexico's claim that the United
States breached its NAFTA obligations to Mexico), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute_
Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset-upload file577_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
18. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (declaring that the
United States failed to abide by the trade sugar agreements in the original
NAFTA). Mexico also claims that the United States blocked the appointment of
panelists to the NAFTA dispute. Id. But see Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft
Drinks and Beverages, Opening Statement of the United States, First Meeting of
the Panel, WT/DS308, 13 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Opening Statement I]
(maintaining that Mexico concedes that the WTO Panel has jurisdiction to hear the
present dispute), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute
Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset-upload file793_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
19. See Peter M. Gerhart & Michael S. Baron, Understanding National
Treatment: The Participatory Vision of the WTO, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
505, 530-31 (2004)" (discussing the application of Article III and Article XX in
GATT jurisprudence). The authors also point out that an Article III violation turns
on whether there is a competitive relationship between the products in question. Id.
20. See discussion infra Part L.A (providing an overview of the national
treatment and general exception principles).
21. See discussion infra Part L.A (reviewing Article 111:2, Article 111:4, and
2005]
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22HFCS tax, as well as U.S. and Mexican arguments regarding the
HFCS tax dispute.23 Part II analyzes these arguments in light of
pertinent Article III, Article XX(d), and Article XX jurisprudence.24
Part III offers recommendations as to how Mexico should alter its tax
measures to remain consistent with Article 111.25 Part III also
proposes that the United States and Mexico should seek a resolution
under NAFTA.
2 6
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION - GATT 1994
1. Article III - National Treatment
National treatment is a central principle of the GATT multilateral
trading system.27 The fundamental premise of the Article III national
treatment obligation is that contracting parties will treat imported
products similar to domestic products.28 The first sentence of Article
111:2 prohibits the application of internal taxes, directly or indirectly,
Article 111:4 jurisprudence).
22. See discussion infra Part I.B (describing the Mexican tax measures, which
led to the present dispute).
23. See discussion infra Parts I.C & I.D (relating the major arguments that the
United States and Mexico submitted to the WTO).
24. See discussion infra Part II (analyzing U.S. and Mexican arguments using
Article III and Article XX case law).
25. See discussion infra Part III (discussing the impact of the Mexican tax
measures and suggestions on how Mexico could conform to Article III of GATT).
26. See discussion infra Part III (suggesting that both parties should abide by
their NAFTA obligations and submit their dispute before a NAFTA Panel).
27. See John H. Jackson, National Treatment Obligations and Non-tariff
Barriers, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 208-13 (1989) (providing commentary on the
national treatment principle and its application by the GATT dispute settlement
body); see also Frederick M. Abbott, GATT and the European Community: A
Formula for Peaceful Coexistence, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1990) (discussing
the national treatment principle in relation to Article XXIV).
28. See GATT, supra note 10, art. III (establishing the national treatment
principle with respect to internal taxation and regulation); see also Michael
Trebilcock, The National Treatment Principle in International Trade Law, 8 U.
TORONTO L.J. 1, 2 (2004) (stating that the relevance of the national treatment
principle grew as a result of the worldwide reduction of tariffs in the 1980s).
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to imported products "in excess of those applied, directly or
indirectly to like domestic products. '29 Article 111:2, second sentence,
states that contracting parties shall not apply internal taxes to
imported or domestic products inconsistent with their obligations
under Article 111: 1,30 which prohibits the application of internal taxes
or charges "to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production."31 Parties can prove an Article
111:2, second sentence violation where two directly competitive or
substitutable ("DCS") products are not similarly taxed.32 Finally,
Article II1:4 states that contracting parties shall provide no less than
favorable treatment to imported products.33
a. Article 111:2, First Sentence: Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
The first step in proving an Article 111:2, first sentence violation
involves a "like products" analysis. 34 The Appellate Body reporting
in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ("Japan Beverages")3 5
29. GATT, supra note 10, art. 111:2, first sentence.
30. Id., art. 111:2, second sentence.
3 1. Id., art. 111: 1.
32. See id. Annex I, Ad. art. III, 2 (noting that an internal tax under 111.2, first
sentence is considered inconsistent with provisions of 111.2, second sentence only
where there is direct competition between the taxed product and a DCS product
which is not similarly taxed); see also Henrick Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Still
Hazy After All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the
GATT/WTO Case-law on Tax Discrimination, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 39, 41 (2004)
(highlighting three WTO cases involving Article 111:2, first and second sentences).
33. See GATT, supra note 10, art. 111:4 (providing that imported products shall
receive equal favorable treatment in all laws or regulations that affect the "sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use" of like domestic products).
34. See Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS58/AB/R; WT/DSlO/AB/R; WT/DSll/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter
Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body] (establishing that the term "like
product" has the same strict interpretation in both Article 111:2 and Article III:4),
available at 1996 WTO DS LEXIS 5, at *42-50. The Appellate Body discussed
that Panels should narrowly interpret the like products standard. Id.; see also
Gerhart & Baron, supra note 19, at 530-31 (noting that Border Tax Adjustments
and the Japan Alcohol cases established the appropriate standard for evaluating
like products). The authors emphasized that WTO Panels evaluate the likeness of
two products in the marketplace. Id.
35. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *1-4
(evaluating whether the Japanese Liquor Tax Law violated Article III, first and
2005] 657
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evaluated likeness based upon the products' tariff classification, end-
uses in the market, consumers' tastes and habits, and the product's
properties, nature, and quality.36 With respect to the "in excess"
clause of Article 111:2, first sentence, the Appellate Body found that
"even the smallest amount of 'excess' is too much. 3 7
The Japan Beverages decision involved Japan's Liquor Tax Law,
which taxed their domestic liquor, shochu, at a lower rate than
imported liquors.38 The Appellate Body found that shochu and vodka
were like products as they were both white/clean liquors composed
of similar raw materials, had similar physical characteristics and end-
uses, and had a comparable tariff schedule under the Harmonized
System ("HS") Classification System.39 Thereafter, the Appellate
second sentence of GATT); see also Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS8/R; WT/DSIOR; WT/DS1 I/R, 6.23-6.25 (July 11,
1996) [hereinafter Japan Beverages, Report of the Panel] (conducting a like
products analysis between domestic and foreign alcoholic beverages), available at
1996 WTO DS LEXIS 6.
36. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *42-
50 (asserting that Panels decide likeness on a case-by-case basis); see also
Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 7 (noting that previous WTO Panels also rely on the
Working Party Report on "Border Tax Adjustments" when evaluating like
products).
37. Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *50
(discussing that a party who fails to afford "identical or better tax treatment" than a
like product will likely fall into the in excess category).
38. See id. at *17-19 (evaluating whether Japan's Liquor Tax Law violated
Article 111:2 of GATT); see also Edward S. Tsai, "Like" is a Four-Letter Word -
GATTArticle III's "Like Product" Conundrum, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'LL. 26, 30-32
(1999) (describing the 1987 Japanese Alcoholic Beverage Report in which the
Panel decided whether shochu and other alcoholic beverages were like products
under Article 111:2). See generally Ramon R. Gupta, Appellate Body Interpretation
of the WTO Agreements: A Critique in Light of Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, 6 PAC. RiM. L. & POL'Y J. 683, 704 (1997) (commenting that the
Liquor Tax Law taxed whisky six times higher than shochu, the local liquor).
39. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 35, 6.23 (noting
that a 1987 Panel considered whether Japan's Liquor Tax Law violated Article
111:2, similarly found that shochu and vodka were like products); see also Japan
Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *45-46 (analogizing
likeness to an accordion and stating that "the accordion of likeness stretches and
squeezes in different places as different provisions of the WTO"); Peggy Chaplin,
An Introduction to the Harmonized System, 12 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 417,
418 (1987) (explaining that the HS Classification System provides a standard
classification structure for internationally traded goods). The author discusses that
658 [20:649
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Body held that the tax on imported liquors was in excess of those on
like local liquors.4" As a result, the Appellate Body found that the
Japanese Liquor Tax violated Article 111:2, first and second
sentences.41
b. Article 1112, Second Sentence: Korea -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
In addition to raising an Article 111:2, first sentence violation, a
party may also raise an Article 111:2, second sentence violation.42 The
Appellate Body reporting in Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
("Korea Beverages"),43 held that a like products characterization is a
"sub-set" 44 of DCS products. 45 Thus, it appears that a WTO panel
will evaluate whether two products are DCS based on their cross-
price elasticity, elasticity of substitution, common end-uses,
the Customs Cooperation Council created the HS System to establish a uniform
reporting system in international trade transactions. Id.
40. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *50
(defining that "in excess of' is "any amount of tax on imported products 'in excess
of the tax on domestic like products").
41. See id. at *70-72 (recommending that Japan conform its Liquor Tax Law to
GATT).
42. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 52 (explaining that in order for a
party to prove an Article 111:2, second sentence violation, they must show that
there is a DCS relationship between two products, that they are "not similarly
taxed," and that the tax measure "affords protection to the domestic industry").
43. See Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS75/AB/R; WT/DS75/AB/R; WT/DS84/AB/R, 2 (Jan. 18, 1999)
[hereinafter Korea Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body], available at 1999
WTO DS LEXIS 3; see also Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the
Panel, WT/DS75/R; WT/DS84/R, 11.1 (Sept. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Korea
Beverages, Report of the Panel] (finding a DCS relationship between the domestic
and foreign alcoholic beverages), available at 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 10. The
Panel recommended that Korea change its laws and conform with its GATT
obligations. Id.
44. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 44, 118
(noting that the DCS classification is broader than the like products category).
45. See id. (discussing that a Panel can evaluate "imperfectly substitutable
products" under Article 111:2 second sentence and "perfectly substitutable
products" under Article 111:2, first sentence). The reverse does not hold, however,
because if a Panel finds that products are DCS, they are not directly regarded as
like products. Id.
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consumers' tastes and habits, the products' properties, and tariff
classifications.46
In Korea Beverages, the Appellate Body held that two Korean
liquor tax laws-which imposed fixed and variable tax rates on
imported spirits47-violated Article 111:2, second sentence of GATT,
finding that Korean soju and other distilled beverages were DCS
products.4 s The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's holding that
their similar physical properties rendered them DCS products,
despite the different filtration and aging processes involved in
producing soju and the imported liquors.49 In distinguishing the
products as DCS, the Appellate Body recognized that soju and other
liquors had comparable end-uses and similar marketing strategies.5 0
Additionally, the Appellate Body found that soju and other liquors
46. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 52 (maintaining that potential
competition and evidence from other markets are relevant factors in determining a
DCS relationship).
47. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, 1
(noting that the government would apply the tax rate depending on which one of
the eleven fiscal categories the alcoholic beverages fell in); see also Korea
Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, 2.20 (discussing that the domestic
liquor, soju, had a tax rate of thirty-five and fifty percent, while imported distilled
liquors had a tax rate of 80 to 100 percent).
48. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, 169
(concluding that soju and the imported liquors were DCS products, and that the
different tax rates imposed on the imported products afforded protection to the
domestic industry); see also Korea Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 43,
10.98 (maintaining that the physical characteristics, end-uses, channels of
distribution and prices led the Panel to determine that soju and the other imported
liquors were DCS products); Dukgeun Ahn, Korea in the GATT/WTO Dispute
Settlement System: Legal Battle for Economic Development, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L.
597, 612-13 (2003) (suggesting that the Korea Alcoholic Beverage cases initiated a
recognition of the WTO among the Korean public).
49. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, T 10.67
(observing that the different filtration and aging processes were an insufficient
basis to preclude a finding of non-substitutability); see also Korea Beverages,
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, 169 (upholding the Panel's
decision).
50. See id. TT 10.78-10.79 (emphasizing that the Panel evaluated market trends
when making its DCS determination). The Panel concluded that the products
competed in the same market. Id.
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had similar channels of distribution and points of sale because
similar retail outlets sold them. 1
c. Ad Article III: Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
After establishing a DCS relationship, a Panel will evaluate
whether the domestic products are "not similarly taxed. '5 2 The
Appellate Body considering Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages
("Chile Beverages")5 3 held that a party must show that a tax
differential is more than de minimis to meet the "not similarly taxed"
standard.5 4 After a Panel finds that a product is "not similarly taxed,"
then it must inquire whether the measure affords protection to the
domestic industry."
51. See id. 10.85-10.86 (noting that restaurants and cafes were major points
of distribution for both soju and the imported alcoholic beverages).
52. See GATT, supra note 10, Annex I, Ad. art. III, 2; see also Japan
Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *58-61 (discussing the
significance of the distinction between in excess of and not similarly taxed). The
Appellate Body held that not similarly taxed involves a different standard than in
excess of. Id.
53. See Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS87/AB/R; WT/DS 11 OAB/R (Dec. 13, 1999) [hereinafter Chile Beverages,
Report of the Appellate Body], available at 1999 WTO DS LEXIS 28.
54. See id. 80 (finding that the Chilean Liquor Tax did not similarly tax
imported alcoholic beverages and afforded protection to the domestic industry);
see also Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *58-61
(holding that panels decide on a case-by-case basis whether a taxation amount is de
minimis and that a burden must be more than de minimis to meet the not similarly
taxed provision). An imported product is not similarly taxed if it is DCS with
domestic products and the taxation level is more than de minimis. Id. Observers
point out that WTO Panels have not defined the term de minimis. Horn &
Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 51.
55. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *61
(asserting that "[i]f the measure is applied to imported or domestic products so as
to afford protection to domestic production, then it does not matter that there may
not have been any desire to engage in protectionism in the minds of the legislators
or the regulators who imposed the measure"). Instead of evaluating legislative
intent, a Panel analyzes how parties apply the tax measure. Id. at *61-62; see also
Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel, WT/DS87/R; WT/DS1 10/R, 7.115 (June
15, 1999) [hereinafter Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel] (noting that the
dispute settlement panels conduct their so as to afford protection inquiry on a case-
by-case basis and analyze the protective application of a tax by its design,
architecture, and the structure of the measure), available at 1999 WTO DS LEXIS
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The Chile Beverages Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's holding
that the Chilean liquor law violated Article 111:2, second sentence of
GATT.5 6 The Chilean law taxed seventy-five percent of the local
liquor at the lowest rate of twenty-seven percent, while taxing
ninety-five percent of imported liquors at the highest rate of forty-
seven percent. 7 The Appellate Body found that the difference in
taxation was more than de minimis, and as such, that the Chilean law
did not similarly tax domestic and foreign products.5 The Appellate
Body also concluded that the structure of the tax measure and the
large margin between the tax rates resulted in a taxation scheme that
afforded protection to the domestic industry. 9
d. Article III:4: Canada - Automotive Industry
The central objective of Article 111:4 is to provide a competitive
relationship in the marketplace for domestic and imported products. 60
To prove an Article 111:4 violation, a complaining party must show
(1) that the imported and domestic products are "like, 61 (2) that the
12. The Panel in this dispute did evaluate legislative intent. Id.
56. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 55, 7.88(concluding that Chilean pisco and the imported distilled spirits and liqueurs were
directly competitive and substitutable).
57. See Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 2000, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1, 37 (2001) (discussing that the WTO Panel questioned the structure
of the Chilean Tax Law in addition to its application).
58. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 53, 80(upholding the Panel's finding regarding the interpretation and application of the
term not similarly taxed); see also Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra
note 55, 7.104 (maintaining that the dissimilar taxation inquiry is separate from
the so as to afford protection inquiry).
59. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 53, 71(noting that Chile had not offered sufficient countervailing arguments to preclude a
finding that its different tax rates intended to afford protection to its domestic
industry); see also Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 55, 7.141(finding that the structure of the Chilean tax was discriminatory where the
domestic industry was the sole beneficiary).
60. See Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS161/AB/R; WT/DS169/AB/R, 1(Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body] (affirming
that Article 111:4 strives to guarantee equal market access and market opportunities
for imported and domestic products), available at 2000 WTO DS LEXIS 36.
61. See Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 35 (explaining that Article 111:4 applies
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measure at issue is a "law, regulation, or requirement affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution,
or use" and (3) that the measure extends "less favourable treatment"
to the imported product than to the domestic product.62
In Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry
("Canada Automotive")63 the Panel evaluated Canadian measures
which granted a duty-free exemption to motor vehicles. 6 The duty-
free treatment only applied to motor vehicles that had a minimum
amount of Canadian value added ("CVA") and a certain production-
to-sales ratio in its local production of motor vehicles. 6 The Panel
found that CVA requirements provided domestic products with an
advantage over imported products.66 As a result, the Panel concluded
that the Canadian measures afforded imported products less
only to like products and not to DCS products). However, panels use the same like
products standard for Article 111:2, first sentence and Article 111:4. Id. at 45.
62. European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R, 210
(Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter European Communities, Report of the Appellate
Body], available at 1997 WTO DS LEXIS 27; see id. 216 (noting that Article
111:4 makes no mention of Article 111: 1, and as such, "a determination of whether
there has been a violation of Article 111:4 does not require a separate consideration
of whether a measure 'afford[s] protection to domestic production"'); see also
Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 36 (discussing that Article 111:4 is a more specific
provision than Article 111: 1). The author asserts that a party does not have to prove
the issue of so as to afford protection because Article 111:4 functions independently
of Article 111: 1. Id.
63. See Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
WT/DS139/R; WT/DS142/R, TT 2.1-2.2 (Feb. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Canada
Automotive, Report of the Panel] (providing a background to the Canadian
measures in dispute), available at 2000 WTO DS LEXIS 72; see also Trebilcock,
supra note 28, at 39-41 (analyzing the Canada Automotive decision with respect to
Article 111:4).
64. See Canada Automotive, Report of the Panel, 2.3 - 2.5 (stating that the
measures arose out of the Auto Pact treaty which sought to expand trade of motor
vehicles and parts between the United States and Canada).
65. See id. 2.3 (establishing that a motor vehicle importer had to meet the
requirements of a "manufacturer" to qualify for the duty exemptions); see also
Bhala & Gantz, supra note 57, at 22-24 (clarifying the three tests that importers
had to satisfy to qualify as a "manufacturer" under the Auto Pact treaty).
66. See Canada Automotive, Report of the Panel, 10.82 (concluding that the
advantage created by the CVA requirements affected the internal sale or use of
domestic products).
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favorable treatment than domestic products, inconsistent with Article
111:4.67
2. Article XY - General Exceptions
Article XX provides a party defending against a claimed breach of
GATT obligations with a series of defenses which are based upon
public policy concerns. 68 The most frequently-litigated public policy
exceptions to members' obligations include protection of health,
enforcement of laws and regulations, and conservation measures.69
For an Article XX defense to apply, the WTO ruling body must first
conclude that the measure violates a GATT provision.7" Thereafter,
the WTO panel analyzes whether the measure falls within one of the
Article XX exceptions.7'
67. See id. 10.85 (finding that the advantage created by the CVA
requirements upset the competitive relationship between domestic and imported
products); see generally Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural
Machinery, Report of the Panel for Conciliation, L/833 - 7S/60 (Oct. 23, 1958)
[hereinafter Italian Discrimination, Report of the Panel for Conciliation] (finding
that an Italian law which granted special credit facilities to domestic agricultural
machinery violated Article 111:4), available at 1958 GATTPD LEXIS 1.
68. See GATT supra note 10, art. XX (providing ten general exceptions to
member-states' GATT obligations); see also Salman Bal, International Free Trade
Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article AX of the GA TT, 10 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 62, 69 (2001) (elaborating on the scope and practice of Article
XX); United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel,
DS29/R, 5.26 (June 1994) [hereinafter U.S. Tuna, 1994 Report of the Panel]
(establishing that Panels should narrowly interpret the Article XX exception under
GATT), available at 1994 GATTPD LEXIS 7.
69. See JoHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT § 13.1 (4th ed. 2002)
(providing an overview of Article XX and jurisprudence on the most frequently
litigated provisions); see also GATT supra note 10, arts. XX(b), XX(d), XX(g)
(providing exceptions for protection of health, enforcement of laws and
regulations, and conservation measures, respectively).
70. See United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, 150 (Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Shrimp Turtle, Report of the Appellate Body] (affirming that a
measure must first have a discriminatory impact), available at 1998 WTO DS
LEXIS 13; see also Alan 0. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 403, 405 (2003) (noting that a party can invoke Article XX as an affirmative
defense in response to an accused breach of GATT).
71. See United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report of the
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a. Article XX(d): Korea - Measures on Beef
Article XX(d) allows a party to secure enforcement of its laws or
regulations through the use of an otherwise inconsistent GATT
measure.72 In Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef ("Korea Beef')73 the Appellate Body stated that a
party who seeks to invoke an Article XX(d) defense must first prove
that the measure is provisionally justified, by demonstrating that the
measure (1) secures compliance with laws or regulations consistent
with GATT and (2) is necessary to secure the stated compliance.74
The Korea Beef Appellate Body analyzed whether Korea's dual
retail system for imported and domestic beef fell under the Article
XX(d) exception of GATT.75 The dual retail system created separate
distribution channels for domestic and imported beef.76 The
Appellate Body found that Korea established the regulation to ensure
Panel, L/6439 - 36S/345, 5.9 (Nov. 7, 1989) [hereinafter U.S. Tariff, Report of
the Panel] (stating that the Panel considered the Article XX(d) exception after
finding that a measure was inconsistent with a GATT provision), available at 1989
GATTPD LEXIS 2; see also United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R, 6.20 (Jan. 29, 1996)
[hereinafter U.S. Gasoline, Report of the Panel] (declaring that the party who
invokes an Article XX exception has the burden of proof), available at 1996 WTO
DS LEXIS 2.
72. See United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel,
DS21/R - 39S/155, 5.40 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter U.S. Tuna, 1991 Report of
the Panel] (holding that the laws or regulations the member-state seeks to enforce
under XX(d) must themselves comply with GATT rules), available at 1991
GATTPD LEXIS 1.
73. Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60.
74. See id. 157 (noting that a party who seeks to claim an Article XX(d)
affirmative defense has the burden of proving both elements); see also Canada -
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Panel, WT/DS3 I/R, 5.7
(Apr. 5, 1997) [hereinafter Canada, Report of the Panel] (same), available at 1997
WTO DS LEXIS 5.
75. See Sykes, supra note 70, at 407 (explaining that Korea's dual retail system
required that small stores only carry domestic or imported beef-with the choice
of which type of beef to sell-while larger stores had to sell domestic and
imported beef, but in separate sections of the store).
76. See Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2001, 19 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 457, 474 (2002) (explaining that the dual system required retail
store owners to distinguish between domestic and imported beef products in their
store displays).
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against deceptive practices which were inconsistent with Korea's
Unfair Competition Act.77 The Appellate Body found, however, that
the dual retail system was not necessary to secure compliance with
the Unfair Competition Act, and that Korea could enforce the Act
through more cost-effective and conventional WTO-consistent
measures. 71 Moreover, the Appellate Body established a balancing
test and found that Korea did not require a dual retail system in other
product areas where similar fraudulent practices could arise. 79
b. The Chapeau to Article XX: United States - Shrimp Turtle
In addition to proving that a measure is provisionally justified
under one of the paragraphs of Article XX, a party must prove that
the measure meets the standard set forth in the introductory phrase to
Article XX, also known as the chapeau.8 0 The central objectives of
the chapeau are to prevent discrimination and guard against
77. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 158
(explaining the rationale of the Korean legislation in enacting the dual retail
system).
78. See id. 172-74 (agreeing with the Panel's finding that Korea could
enforce its Unfair Competition Act with WTO-compatible enforcement measures).
The Appellate Body noted Korea implemented WTO-compatible enforcement
measures for the Unfair Competition Act, such as investigations, prosecutions,
fines and record-keeping, in other related product areas. Id.; see also MELAKU
GEBOYE DESTA, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS, FROM GATT 1947 TO THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 43
(2002) (describing the necessity standard with respect to agricultural products
under GATT). The author noted that Panels consistently interpret "necessary"
under the different GATT provisions. Id. at 44; Bal, supra note 68, at 97-98
(commenting on the current scope and interpretation of the necessary prong under
Article XX).
79. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 164(asserting that WTO panels should weigh the contribution of the measure in
securing the enforcement of a law, the common interests or values sought by the
law, and the impact that the measure has on the imports or exports).
80. GATT, supra note 10, art. XX; see Allan Rosas, Non-Commercial Values
and the World Trade System: Building on Article XX, in ESSAYS ON THE FuTuRE
OF THE WTO: FINDING A NEW BALANCE 80 (Kim Van der Borght et al. eds., 2003)
(reflecting on the strict application of the chapeau in previous WTO
jurisprudence). The author discusses two situations where parties failed to satisfy
the chapeau after meeting the provisional requirements under Article XX. Id. at 80-
81.
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protectionist policies.8" Specifically, the chapeau states that, in its
application, measures cannot arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate
between countries "where the same conditions prevail," nor can they
be a "disguised restriction on international trade."82
In United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products ("Shrimp Turtle"),83 the Appellate Body analyzed
whether a U.S. law prohibiting shrimp imports from countries that
failed to use turtle-excluder devices satisfied the chapeau.84 The
Appellate Body concluded that the law unjustifiably and arbitrarily
discriminated between countries, mainly because of the United
States' failure to negotiate via an international agreement.85 The
Appellate Body also highlighted the coercive effect that the law had
on the policy decisions of foreign nations, which had the effect of
compelling the United States' trading partners to adopt a similar
regulatory program as the United States'.86 The Appellate Body
81. See Rosas, supra note 80, at 81 (noting that when a country discriminates
against imported products, it raises a presumption of protectionism).
82. See Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT
Article XY, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 817, 830-31 (stating that previous panels have
held that publicly announced trade measures are not considered protectionist
policies violating the disguised discrimination provision of the chapeau); see also
Bal, supra note 68, at 71-75 (providing a discussion on how the WTO has applied
the chapeau exception).
83. See Shrimp Turtle, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 70, 1-8
(providing the factual and legal background of the Shrimp Turtle dispute at the
panel stage).
84. See Terence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, Trade and Domestic Protection of
Endangered Species: Peaceful Coexistence or Continued Conflict? The Shrimp-
Turtle Dispute and the World Trade Organization, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REv. 109, 135-139 (1998) (observing that the United States argued that its
measures fell under sections (b) and (g) of Article XX).
85. See Shrimp Turtle, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 70, 171-72
(highlighting that the parties should have attempted to resolve their dispute through
the Inter-American Convention). The Inter-American Convention was an
international agreement that set forth policies relating to the conservation and
protection of sea turtles. Id. 169.
86. See id. 173-75 (finding that the rigid certification and procedural
requirements of the law constituted arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade); see also Gregory Shaffer, International Trade-WTO-
Quantitative Restrictions-Environmental Protection-Endangered Species-US.
Import Ban on Shrimp, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 507, 513 (1999) (comparing the
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ruled, therefore, that the U.S. law was not justified under the chapeau
of Article XX.87
B. MEXICAN TAX MEASURES
In January 2002, the Mexican government imposed a twenty-
percent sales tax and a twenty-percent distribution tax on beverages,
soft drinks, and syrups made from sweeteners other than cane
sugar.88 The Law on the Special Tax on Production and- Services
("Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Produccion y Servicios") taxes
the internal transfer or the importation of all soft drinks and syrups
using sweeteners other than cane sugar.8 9 In addition, the Law on the
Special Tax on Production and Services ("Reglamento de la Ley del
Appellate Body's rationale in previous GATT disputes relating to environmental
disputes in international trade).
87. See Shrimp Turtle, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 70, 186(finding that the U.S. law constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination).
88. See Rebecca Hasset, Sugar War, Bus. MEx., May 1, 2004, at 12
(discussing the history of the sugar dispute and Mexico's rationale for imposing
the HFCS beverage tax), available at 2004 WLNR 11255785.
89. See HFCS Tax, supra note 1, arts. 1-2 (establishing the twenty percent rate
applicable to soft drinks, beverages, syrups, concentrates, powders and flavor
extracts or essences); see also Mexico, Panel Request, supra note 1 (reflecting the
numerous laws passed by the Mexican Congress related to the HFCS beverage
tax); Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Answers of the
United States to Questions of the Panel in Relation to the Second Substantive
Meeting with the Parties, WT/DS308, TT 1-3 (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.
Answers II] (arguing that Mexico's January 1, 2005 amendment of the HFCS tax is
outside the Panel's terms of reference), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute_
Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset-upload file22_6449.pdf (last
visited Apr. 5, 2005). The United States also highlights the changes in the 2005
amendment, but asserts that the tax continues to discriminate against U.S. imports
sweetened with non-cane sugar sweeteners. Id. 5-8. But see Mexico - Tax
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Comments of the United States on
Mexico's Answers to Questions of the Panel in Relation to the Second Substantive
Meeting with the Parties, WT/DS308, TT 1-3 (noting Mexico's claim that panels
have an obligation to evaluate amendments to contested measures even after the
establishment of a panel), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/MonitoringEnforcement/Dispute S
ettlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/assetuploadjfile756 6449.pdf (last
visited April 5, 2005). The United States counters Mexico's assertion and states
that Article 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding does not require that
panels evaluate amended measures after a panel request. Id. 77 1-4.
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Impuesto Especial sobre Produccion y Servicios)90  and the
Miscellaneous Fiscal Resolution for 2004 ("Resolucion Miscelanea
Fiscal para 2004")91 impose a twenty-percent sales tax on services
relating to the transfer and distribution of beverages and syrups not
using cane sugar.92 Specifically, the distribution tax mandates that
manufacturers, producers, bottlers, and importers pay a separate tax
whenever they transfer their goods separately through
representatives, brokers, consignment agents, or distributors. 93
C. U.S. ARGUMENTS
The United States asserts that it established a prima facie case that
the HFCS taxes violate Article 111:2 and Article 111:4 of GATT.94
First, the United States contends that the HFCS tax violates Article
111:2, first sentence.95 Specifically, the United States claims that the
90. Reglamento de la Ley del Impuesto Especial Sobre Produccion y Servicios
[Regulation on the Law on the Special Tax on Production and Services], D.O., 15
de Mayo de 1990 (Mex.) [hereinafter RHFCS], available at
http://www.shcp.gob.mx/ucef/nuevo-marcojuridico/ReglamentodelaLeydellESPS.
pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
91. Resolucion Miscelanea Fiscal para 2004 [Fiscal Resolution for 2004], tit. 6,
D.O., 5 de enero de 2004 (Mex.) [hereinafter RMF], available at
http://www.mexicofiscal.com.mx/novedades/RESOLUCION%2OMiscelC3%Al
nea%20Fiscal%20para%202004.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
92. See Mexico, Panel Request, supra note 1 (describing the Mexican tax
measures with respect to the transfer of beverages, soft drinks, and syrups).
93. See HFCS Tax, supra note 1, art. 5-A (affirming that the distribution tax
only applies to soft drinks, beverages, or syrups that are not sweetened with cane
sugar).
94. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 6 (claiming that Mexico
conceded that HFCS and cane sugar are DCS products).
95. See Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
Executive Summary of the Second Submission of the United States of America,
WT/DS308, 6-19 (Oct. 14, 2004) [hereinafter First Executive Summary]
(maintaining that soft drinks and syrups sweetened with HFCS, and soft drinks and
syrups sweetened with cane sugar are like products and that HFCS soft drinks and
syrups are taxed in excess of soft drinks and syrups made with cane sugar),
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/MonitoringEnforcement/Dispute_
Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListingsasset-upload file544_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
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HFCS tax discriminates against beet sugar, HFCS, and beet sugar-
sweetened soft drinks and syrups. 96
According to the United States, beet and cane sugar soft drinks
and syrups are like products because they share identical chemical
and functional characteristics. 97 In addition, cane sugar and beet
sugar occupy the same HS tariff heading, further supporting the
suggestion that they are like products. 98 With respect to HFCS
sweetened soft drinks and syrups and cane sugar soft drinks and
syrups, the United States argues they are also like products because
they share a comparable physical structure.99 Furthermore, soft
drinks made from HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar all have similar
end-uses and channels of distribution;"° they are also marked by
96. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 10 (asserting that the United
States analyzed its beet sugar claims under the first sentence of Article 111:2 while
focusing most of its HFCS arguments on the second sentence of Article 111:2). The
United States explains that soft drinks and syrups are sweetened with HFCS in the
United States, cane sugar in Mexico, and beet sugar in the European Communities.
Id. $ 29. The United States incorporated beet sugar in its second submission to
bolster the European Communities position. Id.
97. See id. 19 (explaining that cane sugar and beet sugar are both made up of
99.95 percent sucrose and have the same molecular structure). See also TRUESTAR
HEALTH ENCYCLOPEDIA (defining "Refined Sweeteners" and explaining that white
sugar is known by many names, including sucrose, table sugar, cane sugar, beet
sugar, grape sugar, refined sugar, or granulated sugar), at
www.truestarhealth.com/Notes/1904005.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2004). It is
derived from the juice of sugar cane and sugar beets, and once extracted the sugar
cane or sugar beet juice is processed extensively to produce a white, granulated
substance. Id.
98. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 10 (noting that both beet
sugar and cane sugar fall under HS classification heading 1701).
99. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 68-69 (declaring that HFCS and
cane sugar are both colorless and odorless and are similarly digested and absorbed
by the human body); see also Guy. H. JOHNSON, FACTS ABOUT FRUCTOSE AND
OBESITY [hereinafter FACTS ON FRUCTOSE] (discussing that upon digestion, the
human body does not distinguish between HFCS and any other sweetener), at
http://www.refreshments.ca/en/behealthy/template 5-show.asp?id= 1 8&section=c
hoices (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
100. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, $$ 106-16 (arguing that Mexican
bottlers use HFCS and cane sugar interchangeably and buy them through
comparable distribution channels). The United States also contended that the
Mexican authorities stated that "HFCS and [cane] sugar fulfill the same functions
and are commercially interchangeable in the marketplace." Id. 112; see also U.S.
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similar consumer preferences.10 Finally, the United States contends
that the HFCS tax law taxes beet sugar, HFCS, and beet sugar soft
drinks and syrups in excess of cane sugar soft drinks and syrups. °2
The United States also argues that the HFCS tax is inconsistent
with Article 111:2, second sentence." 3 First, the United States notes
Mexico's concession that HFCS and cane sugar are DCS products.' °4
Second, the United States cites the findings of the NAFTA panel in
the Mexico-United States anti-dumping dispute, which held that
HFCS and sugar were like products'05  and commercially
interchangeable.10 6 Additionally, the United States claims that HFCS
and cane sugar have comparable end-uses, as Mexican bottlers use
both products interchangeably in soft drink production.07 The United
States also argues that HFCS and cane sugar are sold through similar
channels of distribution-from producer to bottler-and in some
cases the same company sells both HFCS and sugar to similar
Second Submission, supra note 17, 29 (evaluating the end-uses and consumer
preferences of soft drinks and syrups sweetened with beet sugar and cane sugar in
Europe).
101. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 9 106-10 (highlighting that the
Mexican government also conducted a taste test and that tasters did not prefer
HFCS over other sugars). The United States relies on data compiled by Coca-Cola
showing an absence of consumer preferences for HFCS or beet sugar sweetened
soft drinks versus cane sugar sweetened soft drinks. Id.
102. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 50 (stating that a minimal
difference in taxation levels will satisfy the in excess standard of Article 111:2, first
sentence).
103. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 93, 141-55 (referring to the
discriminatory nature and purpose of the beverage tax).
104. See id. 143 (maintaining that an individual cannot distinguish between a
soft drink sweetened with HFCS compared with cane sugar when looking at the
actual product or ingredients).
105. See NAFTA Coin Syrup I, supra note 12, 506 (holding that HFCS and
sugar are like products because of their sweetening power and nutritional features).
106. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 112 (stating that the Mexican
authorities concluded that HFCS and sugar "fulfill the same functions and are
commercially interchangeable in the marketplace").
107. See First Executive Summary, supra note 95, 30 (noting Mexican bottlers
use varying ratios of HFCS and cane sugar in the soft drink production process).
The United States manufactured HFCS with the objective of entering into the soft
drink industry. Id.
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customers."108 Although the United States admits that HFCS and
cane sugar have different tariff headings, it contends that Mexico's
tariff classification system'0 9 does not differentiate between soft
drinks and syrups sweetened with HFCS or cane sugar. 10 Finally, the
United States argues that there is a direct price and market
relationship between HFCS and cane sugar, and asserts that the
HFCS tax created a shortage of sugar and subsequent sugar price
increases in Mexico.II
In addition, the United States maintains that the HFCS tax is not
similarly applied to cane sugar, 1 2 and that the tax affords protection
solely to the Mexican sugar market."3 The United States points to
Mexican legislative history and claims that Mexico imposed the tax
to protect its sugar industry. 14 Furthermore, the United States alleges
that the HFCS tax violates Article 111:4 because the measures grant a
tax exemption to products made of cane sugar, but not to HFCS or
108. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 114-16 (discussing the major
channels of distribution for cane sugar and HFCS).
109. See ASIA PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION TARIFF DATABASE, MEXICO
ECONOMY INFORMATION, TARIFF VIEWING OPTIONS [hereinafter MEXICAN
TARIFF] (listing the tariff headings of the Mexican Tariff Schedule), at
http://www.apectariff.org/tdb.cgi/ff3235/apeccgi.cgi?MX (last visited Apr. 5,
2005).
110. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 82 (describing the tariff headings
of soft drinks and syrups). The United States maintains that soft drinks and
beverages fall into tariff headings 2202.10 and 2202.90, while syrups fall into tariff
headings 2101.11, 2101.12, 2101.30, 2106.90.05, 2106.90.06, and 2106.90.07. Id.
111. See id., 121 (noting a shortage of sugar, the rise in sugar prices, and
complaints by Mexican consumers of sweeteners).
112. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 131 (claiming that the twenty-
percent tax results in a 400 percent tax on HFCS soft drink and syrup products).
113. See id. 137 (stating that the HFCS tax applies to all sweetener imports
and less than ten percent of domestic sweetener products). The United States
alleges that Mexican sugar remains in an untaxed category. Id.
114. See GACETA PARLAMENTARIA, CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS (MEX.), No. 911-
IV (Dec. 30, 2001) (establishing that one of the incentives for the soft drink tax is
to protect the sugar industry), available at
http://gaceta.cddhcu.gob.mx/Gaceta/58/200 1/dic/Anexo-IV-3ODic.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2005); see also U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 139 (asserting
that the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that the purpose of the soft drink tax was to
protect domestic sugar production).
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beet sugar products."5 Specifically, the United States contends that
the HFCS tax affords cane sugar products an advantage over HFCS
and beet sugar products. 16 These tax measures provide less favorable
treatment to HFCS and beet sugar products." 7
In response to Mexican claims as to the legality of its tax
measures, the United States argues that the terms "laws or
regulations" within the meaning of Article XX(d) do not include
international obligations such as NAFTA." 8 Instead, the United
States argues that the term "laws or regulations" only encompasses
the domestic laws of a country." 9 Furthermore, the United States
asserts that the HFCS tax will not ensure compliance with NAFTA,
especially as the measures apply to all WTO members. 20 Finally, the
115. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 161 (explaining that the tax
applies to the transfer and distribution of HFCS products). The United States also
maintains that the HFCS tax imposes bookkeeping and reporting requirements on
sweeteners other than cane sugar. Id.; see also U.S. Second Submission, supra note
17, 36 (asserting that cane sugar and beet sugar are like products and that the tax
exemption violates Article 111:4).
116. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 36 (stating that cane sugar is
primarily a domestic product, while HFCS and beet sugar are predominantly
foreign products).
117. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 161 (arguing that the Appellate
Body broadly interprets the less favorable treatment standard).
118. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 44 (comparing the "laws or
regulations" language in paragraph (d) of Article XX and the "obligations under"
language of paragraph (h) of Article XX).
119. See U.S. Answers I, supra note 16, 55 (declaring that all of GATT and
WTO jurisprudence involving an Article XX(d) affirmative defense involved
internal laws or regulations). available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/MonitoringEnforcementDispute-
Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset-uploadfile 169_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
120. See Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Closing
Statement of the United States, First Meeting of the Panel, WT/DS308, 9 (Dec. 3,
2004) [hereinafter U.S. Closing Statement I] (maintaining that the United States
has fully complied with its NAFTA obligations), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/MonitoringEnforcement/Dispute_
SettlementlWTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset uploadfile 117_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
2005] 673
AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.
United States argues that the Mexican tax measures are not
necessary 2 1 and are incompatible with the chapeau of Article XX.1 22
D. MEXICO'S ARGUMENTS
In its submissions to the WTO, Mexico concedes that HFCS and
cane sugar are DCS products, and that the government imposed the
twenty-percent tax to protect its domestic industry. 1213 However,
Mexico does not address the merits of the Article III allegations;
rather it asserts that the HFCS tax falls under the Article XX(d)
exception. 124 Mexico claims that the United States is in breach of its
NAFTA obligations by failing to open its sugar market to Mexico.2 5
121. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, T 65 (contending Mexico has
other reasonable alternatives by which to promote its sugar industry and resolve
the NAFTA sweetener dispute with the United States); see also Tatjana Eres, The
Limits of GATT Article XX." A Back Door for Human Rights?, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L.
597, 620-30 (2004) (providing a historical overview of the necessity standard and
its current application in WTO jurisprudence).
122. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 70 (insisting that Mexico's
tax measures are a disguised restriction on international trade); see also Jan
Klabbers, Jurisprudence in International Trade Law, Article XX of GATT, 26 J.
WORLD TRADE 63, 90-91 (discussing the inconsistencies with the interpretation of
"disguised restriction" within GATT and WTO case law).
123. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (asserting that the
Mexican government imposed the tax measures as a response to the U.S. breach of
its NAFTA obligations); see also U.S. Opening Statement I, supra note 18, 2
(positing that the Mexican Supreme Court imposed the HFCS tax to prevent the
displacement of cane sugar).
124. See U.S. Closing Statement I, supra note 120, 2 (showing that Mexico
would not challenge the Article III claims in the current proceedings); see also
Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Opening Statement,
Second Meeting of the Panel, WT/DS308, 4-18 (Feb. 23, 2005) [hereinafter
U.S. Opening Statement II] (detailing and analyzing Mexico's Article XX(d)
defenses in its first and second submissions), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assetsffradeAgreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute-
Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset_upload file629_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
125. See Mexico Extends HFCS Tax, Increases Above TRQ Duty on White Corn,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 2, 2004, at 1 [hereinafter Mexico Extends Tax] (explaining
that the Mexican industry refuses to negotiate the NAFTA sugar market
agreements in 2008); see also Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, Closing Statement of the United States, Second Meeting of the Panel,
WT/DS308, TT 3-8 (Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. Closing Statement II]
(evaluating Mexico's opening statement with respect to its NAFTA allegations),
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The Mexican government counters U.S. arguments by asserting that
a "law or regulation" includes international agreements, and as such,
that NAFTA falls within the Article XX(d) exception. 12 6 Specifically,
Mexico asserts that its imposition of the HFCS tax was necessary, as
it was the only means by which to ensure U.S. compliance with
NAFTA.127
Mexico also requests the WTO panel to decline jurisdiction over
the dispute and remove the case to the NAFTA panel. 1 8 This is
based upon the Shrimp Turtle decision, in which the WTO asserted
that the parties should attempt to resolve their differences according
to the Inter-American Convention on the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles ("Inter-American Convention"), before
seeking a WTO ruling. 129 Likewise, Mexico makes a jurisdictional
challenge, insisting on resolving the sweetener dispute under
NAFTA before the WTO Panel decides whether the HFCS tax is
inconsistent with the national treatment principle under GATT. 30
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute-
Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset_upload file273_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
126. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 45 (evaluating Mexico's
arguments with respect to Article XX(d)).
127. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (noting that WTO
panels narrowly interpret "necessary" under the Article XX(d) exemption).
128. See U.S. Opening Statement I, supra note 18, 16-17 (explaining that
Mexico insists that a NAFTA panel is more likely to appropriately resolve the
sweetener dispute); see also Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15
(contending that the United States failed to abide by the original provisions relating
to sugar market access under NAFTA).
129. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (explaining that the
United States and the complaining parties were also members of an international
agreement). See generally, Craig A.A. Dixon, Environmental Survey of WTO
Dispute Panel Decisions Since 1995: "Trade at All Costs? ", 24 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 89, 105-10 (providing an overview of the Shrimp Turtle
decision and its impact on international environmental measures).
130. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (claiming that the
Mexican government imposed its tax measures in response to the U.S. breach of its
NAFTA obligations); see also U.S. Answers I, supra note 16, 1 (addressing
Mexico's request that the WTO panel remove jurisdiction based on judicial
economy).
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II. ANALYSIS
With respect to Mexico's removal request, the Panel will likely
rule that it has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 3' Moreover, after
evaluating the parties' arguments, the Panel will likely conclude that
the United States has met its burden of proof showing that the HFCS
tax violates Article III of GATT.1 2 The Panel is also likely to reject
Mexico's assertion that the tax measures qualify under the Article
XX(d) exception.'33
A. THE HFCS TAX is INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 111:2,
FIRST SENTENCE
The WTO Panel will likely find that HFCS, beet sugar, and cane
sugar are like products.'34 Similar to the Japan Beverages rationale,
where the Panel found that shochu and vodka were like products in
their diluted form,'35 this Panel will probably conclude that HFCS,
beet sugar, and cane sugar are like products because they exist in a
similar physical state-liquid form-in either soft drinks or
131. See GATT 1994, supra note 10, Annex 2, art. (establishing that the WTO
Panel will hear disputes brought under the GATT agreements); see also id. Annex
2, art. 7.1 (affirming that the WTO Panel will examine the terms of reference cited
by the parties).
132. See Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS34/R, 9.20-10.2 (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter
Turkey, Report of the Panel] (finding that India met its burden of proof after
Turkey's failure to rebut and provide evidence against India's allegations),
available at 1999 WTO DS LEXIS 15.
133. See Conciliation United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies, Report of the Panel, L/5333 - 30S/107, 53 (May 26, 1983)
[hereinafter U.S. Spring Assemblies, Report of the Panel] (finding that Article
XX(d) applied to national laws and regulations consistent with GATT obligations),
available at 1982 GATTPD LEXIS 1; see also Korea Beef, Report of the
Appellate Body, supra note 60, 158 (noting that the Korean government
unsuccessfully invoked Article XX(d) as a basis to enforce a domestic law which
was in violation of GATT).
134. See Tsai, supra note 38, at 30-33 (discussing the like products
interpretation in Article III jurisprudence).
135. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 35, 6.23 (noting
that vodka and shochu share most physical characteristics despite differences in
their filtration processes).
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syrups. 13 6 Moreover, beet and cane sugar's identical chemical and
molecular structures will likely persuade the Panel to find a like
products relationship. 13
7
With regard to HFCS and cane sugar, the Panel may narrowly
interpret whether they are like products. 3 ' Specifically, the Panel in
Japan Beverages refused to establish a like products relationship
between shochu and the liqueurs gin and genever; nor did the Panel
arrive at a like products finding regarding the liquors rum, whisky,
and brandy because of the use of additives, ingredients, and
differences in physical appearance. 139 This Panel may also find that
HFCS and cane sugar are not like products because they lack similar
and physical characteristics in their natural form:' 40 HFCS exists in
liquid form while cane sugar exists in granular form.
14
136. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 101-02 (explaining that HFCS'
form as a liquid sweetener does not distinguish it from cane sugar as a sweetener
for soft drinks and syrups, as bottlers mix cane sugar with water and various
ingredients during the bottling process to manufacture a soft drink); see also U.S.
Second Submission, supra note 17, para 27 (asserting that beet sugar and cane
sugar are interchangeable in soft drinks and syrups).
137. See Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
Executive Summary of the Second Submission of the United States of America,
WT/DS308, 16 (Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Second Executive Summary]
(maintaining that cane sugar and beet sugar contain a similar percentage of
sucrose), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute_
Settlement/WTO/Dispute SettlementListings/asset-upload-file408_6449.pdf
(last visited Apr. 5, 2005); see generally THE SUGAR BUREAU, ALL ABOUT SUGAR:
GENERAL INFORMATION (suggesting that beet sugar and cane sugar undergo a
similar manufacturing process during refinement), at http://www.sugar-
bureau.co.uk/general information/all about-sugar/details.html?act-detail&id-ite
m=471 (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
138. But see Second Executive Summary, supra note 137, 19 (discussing that
Article 111:2, second sentence permits a broader consideration of the products that
are subject to tax measures).
139. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 35, 6.23 (stating the
1987 Panel determined that only vodka and shochu were like products).
140. See NAFTA Corn Syrup I, supra note 12, 504 n.45 (describing the major
physical distinctions between HFCS and cane sugar). The differences between
HFCS and cane sugar include their molecular weight, physical presentation,
solubility, humidity, and chemical reduction capacity. Id.
141. See id. 504 (arguing that their different chemical properties translate to
differences in their market function and application); see also U.S. First
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With respect to the chemical composition of the sweeteners, the
Panel may consider that HFCS and cane sugar have different ratios
of fructose and glucose, thereby showing that a soft drink sweetened
with HFCS is not identical to a soft drink sweetened with cane
sugar.1 42 Conversely, beet sugar and cane sugar share the same ratio
of sucrose, a factor that will likely persuade the Panel to find a like
products relationship. 143 The Panel may also draw on the rationale in
Japan Beverages and evaluate whether the lack of similarity in raw
materials used to make HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar-corn,
beets, and sugarcane, respectively-should prevent a like products
determination." The Panel, however, will most likely consider these
minimal differences in physical and chemical characteristics between
HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar insufficient to preclude a like
products finding. 145 In making its final determination, the Panel will
probably evaluate the physical characteristics of HFCS, beet sugar,
and cane sugar as they exist in soft drinks or beverages, where they
share identical physical and chemical traits. 146
Submission, supra note 5, 101 n.158 (observing that bottlers receive fifty
kilogram bags of sugar at their warehouses). The Mexican bottling industry
customarily receives sugar in granular form for soft drink production. Id.
142. See FACTS ON FRUCTOSE, supra note 99 (indicating that HFCS is either
made of forty-two or fifty-five percent fructose, while sugar has fifty percent
fructose and glucose).
143. See discussion supra note 97 (discussing the nearly identical physical and
chemical structure of beet sugar and cane sugar).
144. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 35, 6.23 (discussing
how the similarity of physical characteristics between vodka and shochu led to the
Panel's like products determination).
145. See id. (finding that vodka and shochu shared most, but not all physical
characteristics sufficient to find a like products determination); see also U.S. First
Submission, supra note 5, 70 (observing that the difference in glucose levels
between HFCS and cane sugar rests between three to five percent); NAFTA Corn
Syrup I, supra note 12, 505 (holding that HFCS and cane sugar both had glucose
and fructose as elemental compounds). The Panel also stated that both products
were "ternary organic compounds of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen ... " Id.; U.S.
Second Submission, supra note 17, 19 (arguing that beet sugar and cane sugar
are "chemically and functionally identical" to each other).
146. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 68 (asserting that both HFCS
and cane sugar appear colorless in a soft drink solution). The United States also
noted that HFCS and cane sugar almost have an identical ratio of fructose and
glucose in a soft drink, beverage, or syrup. Id. 69; see also U.S. Second
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Moreover, the fact that HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar share
comparable end-uses 147 and are marked by comparable consumer
preferences will likely persuade the Panel to find that they are like
products. 148 The Panel in Korea Beverages held that common end-
uses between two products factored into the determination of market
competitiveness. 49 Like the products compared in Korea Beverages,
HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar all compete for the same share of
the soft drink bottling industry.150 Indeed, Mexican bottlers use
HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar for the same purposes. 5' Similar
to the goods in Korea Beverages, Mexican bottlers use the same
marketing and business strategies regardless of whether they use
HFCS, beet sugar, or cane sugar to sweeten soft drinks.'52 Moreover,
Submission, supra note 17, 27 (stating that beet sugar and cane sugar are
interchangeable in soft drinks and syrups).
147. See NAFTA Corn Syrup I, supra note 12, 517 (finding that both HFCS
and cane sugar share similar functions and are commercially interchangeable). The
Panel observed the overlap in end-uses between HFCS and cane sugar in the food
and beverages sector, including the soft drink industry. Id.; see also U.S. Second
Submission, supra note 17, 29 (showing that consumers in Europe drink soft
drinks sweetened with either beet sugar or cane sugar for similar purposes, without
any differentiation).
148. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 79 (discussing that the lack of
consumer preferences for HFCS over cane sugar resulted in a 100-percent
substitution of HFCS for sugar by the mid-1980s in the United States).
149. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, 10.78 (noting
that when two products share common end-uses, potential competition, or
substitutability may result in the future).
150. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 29 (stating that U.S. soft
drink producers refer to soft drink sweeteners as sugar and not as cane sugar, beet
sugar, or HFCS) (emphasis added).
151. See id. 29 (maintaining that Coca-Cola bottlers choose HFCS, beet sugar,
and cane sugar in their soft drink production based on availability and cost); see
also Korea Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, 10.80 (showing how
current market trends are helpful in determining whether products have similar
end-uses).
152. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, 10.79 (noting
that the parties submitted evidence showing similar advertising strategies between
the domestic and imported alcoholic beverages); see also CONTINENTAL REPORT,
supra note 8, at 25 (discussing the soft drink company's marketing and advertising
strategies for Latin America, and more specifically, in Mexico).
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in both the NAFTA Bi-National decision'5 3 and its first submission to
the WTO, Mexico conceded that HFCS and cane sugar fulfill the
same commercial functions and are interchangeable in the
marketplace. 5 4
However, the Panel may also evaluate the findings in the NAFTA
decision in which the Bi-National Panel noted that cane sugar has
broader end-uses than HFCS. 55 Likewise, the Panel could consider
that sugar is a leading sweetener and preferred over HFCS in
industries other than the soft drink market.5 6 As a result, if HFCS
has more limited end-uses than sugar, then arguably its channels of
distribution are probably more limited compared with cane sugar.'57
With respect to consumer preferences, the Panel will likely evaluate
what factors influence a consumer's decision to purchase one
product over another-such as price, presentation, and
environmental impact-in making its like products determination
under Article 111:2, first sentence. 58 Moreover, the Panel might find
persuasive Mexico's concession that HFCS and cane sugar have
identical end-uses in the soft drink industry.'59
Furthermore, with respect to the channels of distribution and
points of sale analysis, the Panel will likely find that comparable
153. See NAFTA Corn Syrup I, supra note 12, 514 (affirming that HFCS and
cane sugar have overlapping functions in the beverage and food industries).
154. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (reporting that
Mexican sources stated that sugar and HFCS are substitutable in soft drinks).
155. See NAFTA Corn Syrup I, supra note 12, 510 (comparing the uses of
HFCS to cane sugar). But see U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, at 39 n.167
(conceding that HFCS does have some differing end-uses in the baking industry,
but asserting that the HFCS tax only affects soft drinks and beverages sweetened
with HFCS).
156. See NAFTA Corn Syrup I, supra note 12, 510 (reciting HFCS'
distinguishing characteristics, which include its "singular functional properties
such as its capacity to form bulks (sic), toasted capacity and crystallization").
157. See id. 488 (asserting that HFCS and cane sugar have different
distribution channels, selling points, and separate functional characteristics).
158. See id. 511 (arguing that the difference in consumer preferences of HFCS
compared with cane sugar precludes a like products determination).
159. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, 10.78 (finding
that the Panel based its analysis solely on the end-uses relevant to the dispute).
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retail outlets sell HFCS, cane sugar, and beet sugar. 60 Likewise, the
panels in Chile Beverages and Korea Beverages found the fact that
the products at issue in each case had similar retail outlets for off-
premise consumption to be an indicator of an overlap of channels of
distribution and points of sale.'
16
Another factor likely to persuade the Panel to conclude that beet
sugar and cane sugar are like products is that they fall under the same
HS tariff heading, just like the liquors in Japan Beverages.162 On the
other hand, HFCS and cane sugar do not share a similar tariff
classification. 63 Tariff classification, however, is only one factor that
Panels consider when making a like products determination.' 64 The
Panel will likely find persuasive the fact that the Mexican tariff
schedule fails to make a distinction between soft drinks sweetened
with cane sugar versus those sweetened with beet sugar or HFCS.
165
160. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, T 29 n.124 (discussing that soft
drink bottlers sell over seventy-five percent of soft drinks and beverages in small
retail stores); see also Second Executive Summary, supra note 137, 16
(indicating that soft drink and syrup producers distribute beet sugar and cane
sugar-based products interchangeably).
161. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 55, T 7.55-7.58
(noting that the practice of grouping goods together in a retail outlet is a factor
supporting substitutability); see also Korea Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra
note 43, IN 10.83-10.84 (observing that alcohol manufacturers sold soju and other
alcoholic beverages in restaurants and cafes); Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 29
(stating that quantitative data is also helpful in determining commercial overlap
between two products).
162. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 35, T 6.23 (finding
that vodka and shochu were like products). The fact that vodka and shochu had the
same tariff schedule was a major factor in the Panel's like products determination.
Id.
163. See FOREIGN TRADE ONLINE, HARMONIZED SYSTEM CODES (2005)
[hereinafter HARMONIZED SYSTEM CODES] (displaying the four different tariff
classifications used for various sugar products), at http://www.foreign-
trade.com/reference/hscode.cfn?code = l 701 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
164. See Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 23 (asserting that the WTO panels also
look at the physical characteristics, end-uses, and the marketplace in making a like
products determination); cf Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 52 (explaining
that Panels require a detailed description of a product's tariff classification).
165. See MEXICAN TARIFF, supra note 109 (limiting cane sugar, beet sugar, and
fructose to their chemically pure form); see also Japan Beverages, Report of the
Panel, supra note 35, T 6.23 (considering as a factor in favor of like products
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Similarly, the HS Classification System does not differentiate
between soft drinks sweetened with HFCS, beet sugar, or cane
sugar. 166
A factor which may preclude a like products determination is the
fact that HFCS and cane sugar are comprised of different raw
materials and that the two products are finished by means of distinct
refining processes. 167 The Panel in Japan Beverages based its like
products determination, in part, on the fact that shochu and vodka
were made of similar raw materials. 68 That Panel also found that
shochu was not like whisky or brandy because different
manufacturing processes were involved. 169 Using the rationale in the
Japan Beverages Panel decision, this Panel may find that HFCS and
cane sugar are not like products. 7 °
Ultimately, however, the Panel will likely conclude that HFCS,
beet sugar, and cane sugar are like products.' If the Panel finds that
HFCS and cane sugar are like products, it will also find that
Mexico's tax measures on beet sugar and HFCS in excess of cane
determination, that at the time of negotiation, vodka and shochu were classified
under the same heading in the Japanese tariffs). As of January 1, 1996,
approximately 7 months before the Panel decision was issued, Japan changed its
tariff classifications placing vodka under heading 2208.90 and shochu under
heading 2208.60. Id.
166. See HARMONIZED SYSTEM CODES, supra note 163 (distinguishing between
cane sugar, beet sugar, "Cane or Beet Sugar, Chemically Pure Sucrose," and
"Other Cane or Beet Sugar, Chemically Pure Sucrose").
167. See discussion supra notes 134-146 and accompanying text (describing the
differences in chemical and physical properties between HFCS and cane sugar);
see also discussion supra note 137 (noting that beet sugar and cane sugar undergo
comparable manufacturing processes).
168. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 35, 6.23 (finding
that vodka and shochu shared most of the same physical characteristics).
169. See id. (noting that the Panel would evaluate whisky, brandy, and shochu
under a directly competitive or substitutable analysis).
170. See id. (holding that differences in manufacturing, use of ingredients, and
appearance disqualified the other alcoholic beverages from shochu, the domestic
liquor).
171. See NAFTA Coin Syrup I, supra note 12, 503 (holding that HFCS and
cane sugar were like products because they had similar sweetening capacities and
nutritional properties); see also discussion supra note 97 (including cane sugar and
beet sugar under the white sugar category).
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sugar in violation of Article 111:2, first sentence. 17 2 Similar to the
Liquor Tax Law in Japan Beverages, the HFCS tax does not provide
identical tax treatment to HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar.173 In
making its determination, the Panel will likely consider the rationale
in Japan Beverages, which established that in-excess taxation is a
very low standard.'74 Thus, the Panel will hold that the HFCS tax
violates Article 111:2, first sentence.'75
B. THE HFCS TAX IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 111:2,
SECOND SENTENCE
If the Panel holds that HFCS and cane sugar are like products,
then it will likely find that they are DCS products.176 However, even
if the Panel does not conclude that HFCS and cane sugar are like
products, it will still determine that they are DCS products based on
their common end-uses, consumer preferences, and channels of
distribution. 77 The Panel will likely find it very persuasive that
172. See HFCS Tax, supra note 1, arts. 1, 2 (reflecting that the HFCS taxes soft
drinks sweetened with anything other than sugar at a twenty-percent tax rate).
173. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 35, 6.24 (discussing
that countries may choose to implement any taxation system so long as they do not
tax imported goods in excess of like domestic products).
174. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *50
(establishing that even a small difference in taxation is "too much"); see also Horn
& Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 50 (noting that a minimal difference in taxation
meets the in excess standard).
175. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 41 (establishing that a Panel will
find an Article 111:2, first sentence violation by establishing a like products
relationship between two products and by finding that the measure taxes the
foreign product in excess of the domestic product).
176. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, 118
(noting that like products are a subset of DCS products). The Appellate Body held
that like products are, by classification, DCS products. Id.; see also Japan
Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *4-7 (finding a DCS
relationship between shochu and other foreign alcoholic beverages and a like
products relationship between vodka and shochu); Horn & Mavroidis, supra note
32, at 45 (asserting that if a Panel considers two products like, then they are per se
DCS).
177. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 106-16 (detailing the
similarities in end-uses, consumer preferences, and channels of distribution
between HFCS and cane sugar); see also discussion supra notes 147-161 and
accompanying text (finding that HFCS and cane sugar compete in the same
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Mexico has conceded that HFCS and cane sugar are DCS
products. 78
The Panel will determine that HFCS and cane sugar are DCS
products, similar to the products in Korea Beverages, because both
HFCS and cane sugar act as sweeteners in soft drinks and thereby
compete in the same marketplace. 179 The Panel, however, may note
the fact that cane sugar has different channels of distribution than
HFCS, as Mexican bottlers receive HFCS imports primarily from the
United States while they receive cane sugar directly from a local
sugar mill or a distributor. 8 These findings, however, are unlikely to
preclude a finding of a DCS relationship between HFCS and cane
sugar.'' With regard to consumer preferences, the Mexican
government conducted a taste test and established that consumers did
not find a difference between HFCS and cane sugar.'82 Moreover, as
discussed in the previous section, HFCS and cane sugar have similar
points of sale.8 3 This evidence, coupled with the NAFTA anti-
dumping determination that HFCS and cane sugar were
marketplace and that producers interchangeably use both products in their soft
drink production).
178. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (maintaining that
HFCS and sugar are substitutable in soft drinks); see also U.S. Opening Statement
I, supra note 18, 3 (affirming Mexico's assertion in its first submission that
HFCS and cane sugar are DCS products).
179. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, 10.78 (showing
that the domestic and foreign alcoholic beverages had a comparable competitive
relationship and that both products competed for a similar market). The Panel also
noted that both products had similar advertising strategies. Id.
180. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 115 (discussing the origins of
U.S. HFCS trade with the Mexican soft drink bottling industry). The United States
concedes that the differences in channels of distribution result from the fact that the
U.S. exports most of its HFCS. Id.
181. Cf Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 55, 7.59
(maintaining that if products were regularly presented separately, it would be "one
piece of evidence that perhaps consumers did not group them together in their
perceptions").
182. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, 112 (stating that thirty taste
testers were empanelled).
183. See discussion supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text (finding that
HFCS and cane sugar are sold in similar retail outlets).
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commercially interchangeable, will lead a Panel to conclude that they
are DCS products.'84
On the other hand, the Panel may find that because HFCS is used
in other industries, there is, in fact, no direct market competition
between cane sugar and HFCS. s5 With regard to price difference,
Mexico may argue that HFCS is significantly cheaper than cane
sugar, 8 6 and that this price disparity negates any suggestion of an
elasticity --of substitution between HFCS and cane sugar.'87
Ultimately, however, the Panel is likely to find the fact that HFCS
and cane sugar compete for the same market as evidence of their
DCS relationship' 88
Once the Panel determines that HFCS and cane sugar are DCS
products, it is also likely to find that the HFCS tax does not similarly
tax HFCS as compared to cane sugar, a violation of Article 111:2,
second sentence.8 9 The Panel in Chile Beverages asserted that
whether a taxation scheme involves a tax differential that is greater
than de minimis varies on a case-by-case basis. 90 Similar to the
184. See NAFTA Corn Syrup I, supra note 12, 7 517 (showing that HFCS and
cane sugar have similar functions in the food and beverages sector). Specifically,
the Panel noted that the HFCS and cane sugar had comparable end-uses in the soft
drink, baking, candy, and dairy sectors. Id.
185. See id. 510 (arguing that sugar is still the dominant sweetener over HFCS
in various industries). Specifically, the complainants note that producers use sugar
in the candy, bakery, cereal, milk, and institutional food industries. Id.
186. See Moore, supra note 3 (discussing the fact that HFCS replaced sugar
because of its low price of eighteen cents a pound in 1991). In 1985, HFCS cost
twenty cents a pound while sugar cost twenty-three cents. Id.
187. See U.S. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the price differential between sugar and HFCS shows that sugar is not
interchangeable with HFCS and does not belong in the same relevant product
market with HFCS).
188. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 5, TT 119-21 (showing an inverse
economic relationship between HFCS and cane sugar).
189. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 51 (observing that the tax
difference between two DCS products has to be greater than de minimis); see also
Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 24 (noting that the not similarly taxed standard is
different than the in excess standard under Article 111:2, first sentence).
190. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 55, 7.90-7.91
(noting that in some instances a small difference in taxation levels could lead to a
de minimis determination, while in other cases a larger difference in taxation levels
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decision in Chile Beverages,191 this Panel will likely conclude that a
twenty-percent difference is enough to establish dissimilar taxation
between HFCS and cane sugar,192 thereby violating the "not similarly
taxed" provision under Article 111:2, second sentence.' 93
As discussed above, Mexico concedes that it enacted the HFCS
tax to protect its domestic industry.194 Although the ruling body in
Japan Beverages 95 discussed the irrelevance of legislative intent
(because of the difficulties in discerning actual legislative
intentions), the Appellate Body in Chile Beverages stated that a
Panel will evaluate objective governmental purposes. 196 This Panel is
also likely to consider Mexico's legislative intent because of
Mexico's previous assertions discussing the protective nature of its
tax measures. 1
97
might be insufficient to make a de minimis finding). The Panel also noted that a de
minimis analysis should depend on the respective market and may take
governmental policies into consideration. Id.
191. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 53, 2
(stating that over ninety-five percent of the foreign spirits fell into the higher tax
category, while over seventy-five percent of the domestic liquors fell into the lower
tax bracket); see also Chile Beverages, Report of the Panel, supra note 55, 2.1-
2.29 (describing the Chilean tax structure in detail).
192. See HFCS Tax, supra note 1, art. 2 (showing that all soft drinks, beverages,
and syrups using a sweetener other than cane sugar are subject to the twenty-
percent tax).
193. See e.g., Chile Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 53,
80 (upholding the Panel's finding that the Chilean liquor law, which taxed
ninety-five percent of imported liquors at the highest tax rate as opposed to only
twenty-seven percent of local liquor, violated Article 111:2, second sentence).
194. See discussion supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that Mexico
publicly acknowledged the purpose of the HFCS tax was to protect its domestic
sugar industry); see also Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15
(reporting that the Mexican government imposed the HFCS tax to protect its
domestic sugar industry against the U.S. failure to grant market access to Mexican
cane sugar).
195. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, *61-62
(stating that the issue whether legislators applied a tax measure to afford protection
to its domestic industry is not a question of legislative intent).
196. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 49 (noting the Appellate Body in
Chile Beverages stated that "statutory purposes or objectives" are pertinent to the
extent that they "are given objective expression in the statute itself").
197. See Donald H. Regan, Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose
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The fact that the HFCS tax only applies to HFCS and not to cane
sugar further suggests that the measure is intended to afford
protection to the Mexican sugar industry.'98 Mexico produces all of
its own cane sugar; therefore, the HFCS tax exclusively favors
domestic sugar producers. 19 Similar to the imported products in
Chile Beverages, which were taxed at a higher rate, HFCS is also
taxed at a greater tax rate compared to cane sugar; this differential in
tax treatment is sufficient to meet the "so as to afford protection"
standard, and is ultimately a violation of Article 111:2, second
sentence.200
C. THE HFCS TAX IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 111:4
The Panel will probably find that the Mexican tax measures
violate Article 111:4.2°1 WTO panels use the criteria of Article 111:2,
under Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 37 J. WORLD
TRADE 737, 739 (2003) (explaining that the Chile Beverages Appellate Body
examined legislative intent when analyzing whether the Chilean System afforded
protection to its domestic industry).
198. See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 57, at 43 (stating that the tax differentials
imposed by the Chilean Liquor Tax led the Appellate Body to conclude that the
measures afforded protection to the domestic industry).
199. See ROBERT KNAPP, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEXICO AND SUGAR:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (stating that sugar comprises Mexico's largest
agricultural crop), available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/sugar/2004/History%20of/20suga/20dispute%20fi
nal.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). The author also stated that the Mexican sugar
industry provides over 300,000 jobs and that 2.2 million people work in the sugar
industry. Id.
200. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 53, 80
(finding that the Chilean Liquor Tax met the not similarly taxed standard and the
so as to afford protection standard, thereby violating Article 111:2, second
sentence).
201. See United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" -
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS 108/AB/RW, 220-22 (Jan. 14, 2002) (concluding that a
fair market rule that would frequently grant a tax exemption to domestic products
and less often to imported products afforded less favorable treatment to imported
products and violated Article 111:4), available at 2002 WTO DS LEXIS 4; see also
Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 146-48 (finding that
Korea's dual retail system, which imposed separate channels of distribution
requirements for imported and domestic beef products, modified market conditions
inconsistently with Article 111:4).
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first and second sentence in determining a like products relationship
under Article 11I:4.202 Thus, if the Panel finds that HFCS, beet sugar,
and cane sugar are like products under Article 111:2, first sentence, it
will also conclude that they are like products according to Article
111:4.203
First, the HFCS tax is an internal law that affects the sale,
distribution, and use of cane sugar and beet sugar, as well as HFCS
soft drinks and syrups. °4 Moreover, since HFCS and beet sugar are
imported products while cane sugar is primarily a domestic product,
the tax exemption affords more favorable treatment to Mexican
sugar.0 5 Mexico's favorable treatment of its domestic industry is
comparable to the facts at issue in Canada Automotive case, where a
GATT Panel found that Canada's CVA requirements afforded less
favorable treatment to domestic motor vehicles inconsistent with
Article 111:4.206 Although Mexico may argue that the HFCS tax does
202. See European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS 135/AB/R, 99 (Mar. 12, 2001) (discussing that the
meaning of like products under Article 111:4 is broader than Article 111:2, first
sentence, but not broader than both the first and second sentences of Article 111:2),
available at 2001 WTO DS LEXIS 12; see also Sydney M. Cone, III, The Asbestos
Case and Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: The Uneasy
Relationship Between Panels and the Appellate Body, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 103,
124 (2001) (inferring that the scope of like products under Article 111:4 extends to
DCS products under Article 111:2, second sentence).
203. See U.S. Gasoline, Report of the Panel, supra note 71, 6.8 (stating that the
Panel in Japan Beverages considered the criteria for determining like products to
be applicable to the like products analysis under Article 111:4); see also Trebilcock,
supra note 28, at 48 (noting that the principal criteria in analyzing likeness under
Article 111:4 involves an examination of the competitive relationship between
domestic and imported products).
204. See HFCS Tax, supra note 1, arts. 1.11, 2.11(A) (establishing that the HFCS
tax applies to beverages that use sweeteners other than cane sugar and that it also
applies to the distribution of non-cane sugar sweeteners).
205. See FARM FOUNDATION, TRADE DISPUTES IN AN UNSETTLED INDUSTRY:
MEXICAN SUGAR (noting that Mexicans consume over eighty-five percent of their
domestic sugar production), available at
http://www.farmfoundation.org/flags/shwedel.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). The
author also notes that the Mexican sugar industry creates over 700,000 jobs, which
affects over four million people in Mexico. Id.
206. See Canada Automotive, Report of the Panel, supra note 63, 10.85
(noting that the Canadian measures upset the competitive relationship between
domestic and imported motor vehicles); see also U.S. Asks WTO to Arbitrate
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not make a distinction between imported or domestic products
because it grants the exemption to all cane sugar products, the
application of the HFCS tax only benefits domestic products; thus,
the measure is inconsistent with Article 111:4.207
D. THE HFCS TAx is NOT PROVISIONALLY JUSTIFIED UNDER
ARTICLE XX(D)
The Panel will likely find that the HFCS tax is not provisionally
justified under Article XX(d).2 °8 In addition, the Panel will probably
conclude that the HFCS tax does not satisfy the chapeau of Article
XX, and will ultimately hold that the Mexican tax measures are not
permissible under Article XX(d).20 9
1. NAFTA is Not a Law or Regulation Under Article XX(d)
Since Mexico's primary argument is that the HFCS tax falls under
Article XX(d) as necessary to enforce NAFTA, Mexico has the
burden of proving that NAFTA is a "law or regulation" within the
meaning of Article XX(d).21 ° Mexico's failure to cite in its
submissions previous Article XX(d) WTO or GATT jurisprudence
involving compliance with an international regulation will most
likely preclude Mexico from succeeding in its invocation of the
Article XX(d) exception.21
Fructose Dispute, Bus. MEX., July 1, 2004, at 11 (stating that the Mexican
President enacted the HFCS tax to "protect Mexico's struggling sugar industry"),
available at 2004 WL 65679227.
207. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 134
(stating that Article 111:4 ensures equal market opportunities for like domestic and
imported products).
208. See U.S. Spring Assemblies, Report of the Panel, supra note 133, 53
(noting that Article XX(d) pertains to domestic laws or regulations); see also U.S.
Tariff, Report of the Panel, supra note 71, 5.8 (examining a U.S. patent law
under the Article XX(d) exception).
209. See Rosas, supra note 80, at 80-81 (discussing that although the parties met
the first requirement of Article XX, the Panel found that their measures did not.
meet the chapeau standard).
210. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 157
(establishing that the party who invokes the Article XX(d) affirmative defense has
the burden of proving the elements).
211. See Second Executive Summary, supra note 137, 44 (stating that neither a
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The Panel may, however, consider Mexico's argument that the
failure of previous GATT or WTO bodies to define "laws or
regulations" within the context of Article XX(d) would allow a Panel
to expand the scope of the provision to include international laws or
agreements.21 2 Furthermore, the clause "laws or regulations" fails to
incorporate limiting terms such as "domestic" or "internal," another
factor tending in favor of a broader interpretation of the Article
XX(d) provisions.13 The United States' argument comparing Article
XX(d)'s "laws or regulations" language to Article XX(h), which
includes "international commodity agreement, '21 4  will likely
persuade the Panel to limit Article XX(d)'s scope to domestic laws
and regulations.2 5
Moreover, previous WTO decisions that have examined "laws or
regulations" within the Article XX(d) exception have all involved
disputes pertaining to domestic laws,1 6 whereas NAFTA is an
international agreement between the United States, Mexico, and
Canada.217 As a result, the Panel is exceedingly likely to find that
contracting party of GATT nor a member of the WTO have ever challenged the
assertion that laws or regulations under Article XX(d) include international
agreements).
212. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 49 (remarking on Mexico's
argument regarding the lack of GATT or WTO jurisprudence rejecting Mexico's
reading of laws or regulations).
213. See Bal, supra note 68, at 87-89 (proposing a more expansive interpretation
to the laws or regulations provision within Article XX(d)). The author contends
that laws or regulations should include international agreements and that "there is
no persuasive argument for limiting the application of Article XX(d) to domestic
laws or regulations." Id.
214. See GATT, supra note 10, art. XX(h) (providing an exception for measures
"undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity
agreement").
215. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 44 (insisting on a different
interpretation of "laws or regulations" compared to "international commodity
agreement" under Article XX).
216. See, e.g., Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 158
(declaring that the Korean government invoked Article XX(d) to secure
compliance with its national laws to prevent deceptive practices); see also U.S.
Tariff, Report of the Panel, supra note 71, $$ 5.8-5.9 (analyzing whether Section
337 of the U.S. Tariff Act fell under the Article XX(d) exception).
217. See NAFTA, supra note 11, pmbl. (establishing that the governments of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States will cooperate to ensure "harmonious"
690 [20:649
MEXICO SWEETENER TRADE DISPUTE
both the lack of GATT or WTO jurisprudence on an expanded
interpretation of "laws or regulations," and the distinction between
paragraphs (d) and (h) of Article XX, are sufficient to show that
NAFTA is not a law or regulation within Article XX(d).218
In addition, Mexico's reliance on the Shrimp Turtle decision to
bolster its claim that Article XX(d) includes an international
agreement is equally unpersuasive. 2 9 Although the case involved an
international agreement-the Inter-American Convention-the
dispute fell under Article XX(g) which relates to conservation of
exhaustible natural resources. 220 Also, the parties in Shrimp Turtle
were not seeking to enforce an international agreement, as Mexico
asserts that it is in this dispute.221
2. The HFCS Tax is Not Necessary to
Secure Compliance with NAFTA
Even assuming the Panel finds that NAFTA falls within the scope
of Article XX(d), the HFCS tax is not necessary to secure
compliance with NAFTA.222 First, as the WTO lacks jurisdiction to
decide whether the United States is in compliance with NAFTA, the
Panel will only evaluate the Article III claims, and not laws
international trade cooperation).
218. See discussion supra notes 210-221 and accompanying text (examining
U.S. and Mexican arguments regarding the applicability of XX(d) to NAFTA).
219. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (noting that the parties
in the Shrimp Turtle dispute were also signatories to an international agreement).
220. See GATT, supra note 10, art. XX(g) (providing an exception for measures
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption"); see also Bradly Condon, Multilateral Environmental Agreements
and the WTO: Is the Sky Really Falling?, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 533, 544-45
(2002) (discussing the jurisdictional issues that arose in the Shrimp Turtle decision
in light of Article XX(g)).
221. See Shrimp Turtle, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 70, 10-28
(restating the United States' arguments regarding the necessity of its measures
under Article XX(g)).
222. See Klabbers, supra note 122, at 91 (stating that WTO Panels evaluate
whether there are GATT consistent alternative measures in making a necessity
determination); see also Mexico Extends Tax, supra note 125, at 10 (discussing the
complexities of the sweetener dispute between the United States and Mexico over
sugar market access according to NAFTA).
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established under NAFTA.223 Indeed, Mexico agrees with the United
States that the WTO only has jurisdiction over the GATT agreements
and not over NAFTA issues. 2 24
Past WTO and GATT panels have narrowly interpreted whether a
measure qualifies under the "necessary" exception.225 The Panel will
likely evaluate the "necessity" of the Mexican tax measures under
the balancing test applied in Korea Beef.2 26 Mexico has not made a
showing as to how the HFCS tax will have any bearing on U.S.
compliance with NAFTA 27 In addition, since the implementation of
the HFCS tax, there has been no resolution between the United States
and Mexico regarding their NAFTA obligations.228
Included in the balancing test the Appellate Body set forth in
Korea Beef was the question of whether there are any "common
interests or values" protected by the particular law or regulation.229
The present Panel will likely find that Mexico's interest in protecting
and obtaining market access for its sugar industry is incompatible
with the interests envisioned under Article XX(d).230 Just as the
223. See GATT 1994, supra note 10, Annex 2, art. 1 (establishing that the WTO
dispute settlement body will hear disputes related to the covered agreements).
224. See id. Annex 2, art. 11 (setting forth that the purpose of the panels is to
evaluate claims under GATT); see also U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17,
57 n.77 (citing to Mexico's First Opening Statement and asserting that Mexico
concedes that the dispute settlement body does not have the power to hear claims
unrelated to the covered agreements under GATT).
225. See Bal, supra note 68, at 99-102 (criticizing the WTO panels' narrow
construction of the necessary prong of Article XX); see also Mexico: NAFTA, Not
WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (observing that the Shrimp Turtle Panel, as well as other
panels, interpreted the Article XX exemptions narrowly).
226. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 164
(establishing that a necessity analysis involves factors such as the "contribution
made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at
issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation imports or
exports").
227. See U.S. Answers I, supra note 16, 24 (noting that the United States and
Mexico disagree as to their obligations under NAFTA).
228. See USTR Challenges, supra note 13, at 7-8 (commenting that the NAFTA
sugar dispute between the United States and Mexico began in 1998).
229. Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 164.
230. See Rosas, supra note 80, at 80-81 (noting that panels will reject a party's
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Korea Beef Appellate Body noted that "common interests" are
different from protectionist policies, this Panel will likely also
conclude that Mexico's interests fail to meet or satisfy the values
protected by the Article XX(d) exception z.2 3 Thus, the Panel will
likely find that the HFCS tax is not sufficiently "necessary" to fall
within the Article XX(d) exception.232
Additionally, while Mexico's contention that it lacks reasonable
alternative means by which to pursue the sweetener dispute may be
deemed persuasive, it is probably insufficient to satisfy the
"necessary" standard.233 Previous GATT and WTO decisions have
strictly interpreted whether a party has reasonable alternative
measures in resolving their trade disputes.234 Panels rarely find that
measures are necessary, even in situations where the parties failed to
cooperate with international agreements. 235 As a result, Mexico's
allegation that the United States blocked the establishment of a
NAFTA Panel is unlikely to convince this Panel to find that the
measures were necessary, especially since the sweetener dispute is
still pending before NAFTA.236
invocation of Article XX if the measures have a protective application).
231. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 181
(finding that Korea could have enforced its laws by more cost effective and WTO
consistent means).
232. See Klabbers, supra note 122, at 92 (stating that when a party invokes the
Article XX(d) exception, the measures must have a specific objective to meet the
necessary test).
233. See Bal, supra note 68, at 101-02 (criticizing the narrow interpretation of
the necessary standard in GATT and WTO jurisprudence). The author discusses
that the dispute settlement panels "have created a high threshold for the term
necessary." Id.; see also Sykes, supra note 68, at 407-15 (providing a historical
overview of Article XX's alternative measures standard in GATT and WTO
jurisprudence).
234. See U.S. Tuna, 1994 Report of the Panel, supra note 68, 5.34-5.39
(rejecting a U.S. argument that it had no reasonable alternative measures under
Article XX).
235. See Bal, supra note 68, at 100 (opining that in U.S. Tuna, the Panel rejected
the United States' argument that there was no other reasonable alternative, even
though the United States showed that dispute settlement efforts under a different
international agreement had proven ineffective).
236. See id. (observing that the Panel found the U.S. measure was not necessary
under Article XX even though Mexico had been unwilling to cooperate pursuant to
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Finally, the Panel will consider the impact of the HFCS tax on
imports and exports.237 Mexico's strongest argument is that the
United States' failure to abide by certain NAFTA provisions limited
Mexico's market access for sugar exports by millions of dollars.238
However, the appropriate inquiry focuses on the impact that the
HFCS tax has on both exports and imports.239 Similar to the Korea
Beef opinion, where a Panel found that the measures translated into
high-cost imported goods and hurt retailers of imported goods, this
Panel will likely find that the HFCS tax measures have a significant
monetary impact on HFCS imports, which is likely dissuade the
Panel from finding that the tax measures are "necessary" under
Article XX(d).24 0
3. The HFCS Tax Does Not Satisfy the Chapeau of Article XY
In addition to finding that the HFCS tax is not provisionally
justified under Article XX(d), the Panel will also likely find that the
tax measures do not meet the standard set forth in the chapeau.24'
Although the Panel may find that the HFCS tax does not rise to the
level of "arbitrary or unjustifiable," the protectionist nature of the
their international arrangements).
237. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 164
(emphasizing that the necessary balancing test includes the consideration that a
measure has on imports or exports).
238. See Mexican Sugar-Cane Growers Protest Government's Plan to Change
Pricing Mechanisms, SOURCEMEX ECON. NEWS & ANALYSIS ON MEX., Jan. 26,
2005 [hereinafter Sugar-Cane Growers] (noting that the failure of the United
States to abide by its NAFTA obligations and HFCS competition have hurt the
Mexican sugar industry), available at 2005 WL 66533302.
239. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 172
(examining the effects that the dual retail system had on imported goods and
retailers of imported goods).
240. See Mexico Extends Tax, supra note 125, at 10 (explaining that the
Mexican tax measures have adversely affected U.S. HFCS exports for over two
years).
241. See discussion supra note 81 and accompanying text (stating that the
central objectives of the chapeau are to prevent discrimination and guard against
protectionist policies); see also Rosas, supra note 80, at 80 (reflecting on the
restrictive and narrow application of the chapeau of Article XX).
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HFCS tax constitutes a disguised form of discrimination and thus
does not satisfy the chapeau of Article XX.
242
Mexico will likely try to prove that its tax measures are neither
arbitrary nor unjustifiably discriminatory. 243 As Mexico has shown, it
has negotiated and consulted with the United States via NAFTA
dispute settlement mechanisms since 2000.24 Thus, unlike the parties
in Shrimp Turtle-who failed to engage foreign governments in
consultations regarding their trade dispute-Mexico has shown that
it did attempt to resolve the sweetener dispute through the
mechanisms provided for under NAFTA.245 Moreover, the Panel is
also likely to find that the HFCS tax does not exhibit the same
coercive nature or rigid requirements as the measures at issue in
Shrimp Turtle.246 Unlike the laws involved in Shrimp Turtle, which
effectively forced all foreign countries to adopt a regulatory program
242. See Chamovitz, supra note 82, at 47 (remarking that the central objective
behind the chapeau of Article XX is to prevent against protectionist policies).
243. See Shrimp Turtle, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 70, 172
(asserting that the United States' failure to seriously negotiate with certain parties
to the Inter-American Convention who export shrimp, but negotiated seriously
with others, was "plainly discriminatory, and in our view, unjustifiable"); see also
Klabbers, supra note 122, at 89 (stating that panels simultaneously interpret the
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination provisions of Article XX).
244. See, e.g., U.S., Mexico Sweetener Talks Advance on Most Critical Hurdle,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 6, 2004, at 9 (examining the negotiations made by
Mexico and the United States to resolve the NAFTA sweetener dispute); see also
U.S. Mexican Industries Make New Stab at Resolving Sweetener Dispute, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Apr. 23, 2004, at 13-14 (discussing that the two main issues regarding
the NAFTA dispute involve Mexico's access to the U.S. sugar market and its
above-quota tariff rate after 2008, as originally envisioned in the original NAFTA
agreement).
245. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (noting that Mexico
requested the establishment of a NAFTA panel in 2000, which the United States
subsequently blocked); see also United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/RW, 122 (June 15, 2001) (maintaining that a
panel is less likely to find arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination when countries
make a good faith effort to negotiate via international agreements), available at
2001 WTO DS LEXIS 19.
246. See Shrimp Turtle, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 70, 163
(noting the rigid and unbending nature of the U.S. measure at issue).
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similar to the U.S. law, the HFCS tax does not have such coercive
requirements or effects.247.
Nonetheless, the Panel is likely to find that the HFCS tax is a
disguised form of discrimination because of the protectionist policy
underlying the tax.248 Mexico unpersuasively argues that the HFCS
tax is not a disguised restriction on trade because it has publicly
announced its tax measures.249 Article XX's purpose, however, is to
guard against protectionist measures.25 ° Since Mexico concedes that
it enacted the tax to protect its sugar industry, it is very unlikely that
the Panel will find that the HFCS tax is not a disguised restriction on
international trade. 2 1 As a result, the Panel will likely find that the
HFCS tax is a disguised form of discrimination, thereby failing to the
requirements for the chapeau of Article XX(d) 2
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The WTO Panel should conclude that the HFCS tax violates
Article 111:2 and Article 111:4 of GATT and should recommend that
Mexico revise its tax structure to conform with its national treatment
obligations.253 Specifically, Mexico should eliminate or lower its tax
247. See id. (discussing that the U.S. law does not consider other measures taken
by countries to comply with the conservation of sea turtles).
248. See Bal, supra note 68, at 73-74 (confirming that the goal of the "disguised
restriction" term of Article XX is to prevent parties from engaging in protectionist
measures).
249. See U.S. Second Submission, supra note 17, 70 n.92 (citing Mexico's
First Submission to the WTO panel, in which it states that their purpose in passing
the law "has 'been stated by members of Congress and analyzed by the Supreme
Court of Justice"').
250. See Rosas, supra note 80, at 81 (stressing that the central goal of Article
XX is to guard against protectionist policies); cf Klabbers, supra note 122, at 90-
91 (criticizing the disguised restriction analysis under Article XX as it revolves
around the term "disguised" instead of "restriction").
251. See Michael O'Boyle, Nafia "s Birthday Party, Bus. MEX., Feb. 1, 2004, at
28 (stating that Mexico imposed the HFCS tax as a response to the U.S. failure to
increase Mexico's annual sugar quota), available at 2004 WLNR 11183777.
252. See Klabbers, supra note 122, at 89 (affirming that a party must satisfy all
of the provisions of Article XX in order for the otherwise inconsistent measures to
circumvent the requirements of GATT).
253. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 53, 81
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rate254 to meet its Article 111:2 obligations, and should remove the tax
exemptions on cane sugar-based soft drinks and beverages to satisfy
Article 111:4.255 The Panel should conclude that the HFCS tax is not
provisionally justified under XX(d) to secure compliance with
NAFTA; however, it should still recommend that Mexico and the
United States make concerted efforts to resolve their long-standing
NAFTA dispute.256 By implementing any one of these measures,
Mexico can avoid the continuing violation of Article 111.257
A. MEXICO SHOULD TAX CANE SUGAR-BASED
SOFT DRINKS AND BEVERAGES SIMILAR To BEET SUGAR AND
HFCS-BASED PRODUCTS
If the WTO Panel finds that the HFCS tax violates Article 111:2,
first and second sentences, Mexico must revise its tax measures in
order to meet its Article III obligations under GATT.258 Indeed,
(requesting that Chile conform its tax laws with its national treatment obligations
of GATT); see also Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34,
at *70-72 (upholding the Panel's finding that the Japanese Liquor Tax Law
violated Article 111:2, first and second sentences and recommending that Japan
conform with its GATT obligations).
254. See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 57, at 43-44 (noting that WTO Panels are
increasingly skeptical of national taxation measures that seek to prevent
competition from foreign products).
255. See Italian Discrimination, Report of the Panel for Conciliation, supra note
67, 25 (requesting that the Italian government revise its laws granting more
favorable credit terms to its domestic agricultural machinery in accordance with
Article 111:4).
256. See generally O'Boyle, supra note 251 (indicating the failure of the
NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism to effectively manage the NAFTA
sweetener dispute). The author comments that the United States and Mexico have
failed to agree on the applicability of side agreements in relation to Mexico's
access to the U.S. sugar market. Id.; Rafael Fernandez de Castro & Rossana
Fuentes Berain, Hands Across North America, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2005, at
A17 (proposing that the United States, Mexico, and Canada engage in a shared
customs union to resolve their economic disagreements under NAFTA), available
at 2005 WLNR 4818153.
257. See Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 5 (showing that the central inquiry of a
national treatment violation focuses on whether governments discriminate between
foreign products and domestic products).
258. See Japan Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 34, at *1-4
(finding that the Panel found that the Japanese Liquor Tax Law was inconsistent
with Article 111:2 and that as a result, Japan had to revise its tax measures).
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Mexico can meet the requirements of Article 111:2, first sentence, by
either eliminating the tax altogether or applying the tax to soft drinks
and beverages sweetened with cane sugar.259  The Mexican
government admitted that it imposed the soft drink tax to boost its
economy, as the soft drink market comprises a major share of the
country's economic output.2 60 In order to meet its financial goals,
Mexico should impose the soft drink tax equally, on both cane sugar-
based beverages and soft drinks and the HFCS and beet sugar-based
products,26' thereby receiving tax revenues from both markets.262
Mexico can also eliminate the soft drink tax altogether and turn to
other sources of revenue to meet its fiscal and budgetary goals. 63
Ultimately, by taxing HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar-based
beverages similarly, Mexico will bring its laws into conformity with
Article III:2.26
B. MEXICO MUST LOWER THE TAX RATE CURRENTLY APPLIED TO
SOFT DRINKS AND BEVERAGES SWEETENED WITH HFCS
If the Panel concludes that HFCS and cane sugar are like products,
then it will also find that that the two products are in a DCS
259. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 41 (noting that excessive taxation
under Article 111:2, first sentence or dissimilar taxation under Article 111:2, second
sentence is a violation of GATT's national treatment obligations).
260. See Soft Drink Tax, supra note 7 (stating that Mexico wanted to reform its
tax system especially since its economy shrank by 1.6 percent within three
months). The author noted that the U.S. economic slowdown also led to the
contraction of Mexico's economy. Id.
261. See Malkin, supra note 14 (discussing that the soft drink tax ensured the
continued operation of the sugar mills and a stronger cane sugar market).
262. See Mexico Lifts Corn Syrup Tax, AGJOURNAL, Mar. 5, 2002 (reporting
that Mexico imposed the soft drink tax with the stated goal of boosting government
income), at http://www.agjournal.com/story.cftn?storyid=1807 (last visited Feb.
22, 2005).
263. See Mexico Lifts Corn Syrup Tax, supra note 276 (showing that the United
States argued that the twenty-percent tax on HFCS sweetened soft drinks and
beverages would not raise enough income for Mexico).
264. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 50 (discussing the tax differentials
on like and DCS products that violate Article 111:2, first and second sentences of
GATT).
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relationship.265 Mexico must lower its taxes on soft drinks and
beverages that use sweeteners other than cane sugar in order to
conform with Article 111:2, second sentence of GATT.266 Specifically,
the Mexican government should lower the tax rate it currently
applies to beverages sweetened with HFCS to a level that meets the
de minimis standard.267 As discussed above, the Appellate Body in
Chile Beverages found that a tax difference over twenty percent
exceeded the de minimis standard.268 The Appellate Body noted that
future Panels should decide whether measures exceed the de minimis
standard on an individual basis.269 With respect to this dispute,
Mexico has a greater chance of complying with the Article 111:2,
second sentence obligations if the tax rate is less than twenty
percent.270 For example, the Mexican government could tax soft
drinks using sweeteners other than cane sugar at a ten percent or five
percent rate.27' A smaller tax differential between HFCS and cane
sugar-based beverages might bring Mexican tax provisions below the
265. See Korea Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, 118
(establishing that panels evaluate imperfectly substitutable products under Article
111:2, second sentence). It also noted that the DCS standard is broader than the like
products standard. Id.; see also Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 45
(maintaining that panels consider all like products to fall within the DCS category).
266. See Gupta, supra note 38, at 703-04 (showing that the Panel in Japan
Beverages found that the fact that the tax rate was six times higher on foreign
alcoholic beverages was sufficient to fird an Article III:2, first and second sentence
violation).
267. See Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 24 (demonstrating that a party must show
that an internal tax is more than de minimis in order to meet the not similarly taxed
standard of Article 111:2, second sentence).
268. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.c (explaining the structure and application
of the Chilean Liquor Tax).
269. See Chile Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 53, 54
(holding that the issue of whether products are not similarly taxed is distinct from
the so as to afford protection analysis).
270. See Trebilcock, supra note 28, at 24 (discussing that the complaining party
must prove that the tax burden on the foreign products is higher than on domestic
products).
271. See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 57, at 42 (stating that a twenty-percent
taxation difference between the local and imported alcoholic beverages was more
than de minimis, thereby meeting the not similarly taxed standard).
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de minimis threshold, allowing the Mexican government to maintain
the HFCS tax law.272
C. MEXICO MUST REMOVE THE TAX EXEMPTIONS ON CANE
SUGAR-BASED SOFT DRINKS AND SYRUPS
Currently, Mexico's HFCS tax provides an advantage to cane
sugar, almost exclusively a domestic product, and a disadvantage to
HFCS and beet sugar, primarily imported products. 273 As a result,
Mexico's tax measures provide less favorable treatment to foreign
products compared with its national product. 74 As such, Mexico
should remove its tax exemptions on cane sugar-based soft drinks
and syrups in order to fulfill its Article 111:4 commitments.275
D. THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO SHOULD RESOLVE THEIR
LONG-STANDING NAFTA DISPUTE
As the United States and Mexico have failed to resolve the
sweetener dispute through negotiations, they should attempt to work
out their differences through a NAFTA dispute settlement body.276
The United States should not unilaterally block the appointment of
panelists and evade its NAFTA commitments.277 By blocking
panelists and avoiding its NAFTA obligations, the United States
undermines the dispute settlement process provided for under
272. See Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 32, at 51 (noting that WTO Panels have
not defined de minimis, and determine this standard on a case-by-case basis).
273. See, e.g., Second Executive Summary, supra note 137, 32 (confirming
that the tax exemption only applies to cane sugar products).
274. See Korea Beef, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 60, 133
(affirming that parties cannot afford less favorable treatment to like imported
products).
275. See Italian Discrimination, Report of the Panel for Conciliation, supra note
67, 25 (finding that the Italian law violated Article III:4 and recommended that
the government eliminate its laws in conformity with GATT).
276. See USTR Challenges, supra note 13, at 7 (discussing that the sugar dispute
between the United States and Mexico stems from a disagreement over NAFTA
provisions regarding Mexican sugar access).
277. See Mexico: NAFTA, Not WTO, supra note 17, at 15 (reporting that the
United States has not cooperated with Mexico in the appointment of panelists in a
NAFTA dispute settlement body).
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NAFTA.2 71 The United States and Mexico should submit to a panel
under NAFTA and find an efficient resolution to their dispute.2 79
CONCLUSION
The HFCS tax Mexico imposed on soft drinks and beverages that
do not use cane sugar as a sweetener violates Article III of GATT.28 °
The WTO Panel will likely find an Article 111:2, first sentence
violation and conclude that HFCS, beet sugar, and cane sugar are
like products and that the HFCS tax taxes beet sugar and HFCS in
excess of cane sugar.28 l In addition, the Panel will establish an
Article 111:2, second sentence violation by finding that HFCS and
cane sugar are in a directly competitive and substitutable
relationship, are not similarly taxed, and that the tax measure affords
protection to the domestic sugar industry.28 2 With regard to Article
111:4, the Panel will probably find that Mexico's tax measures afford
less favorable treatment to HFCS and beet sugar.283 Finally,
Mexico's Article XX(d) affirmative defense is unlikely to persuade
the Panel.284
278. See generally O'Boyle, supra note 251 (remarking on the inadequacy of the
NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism to resolve the sweetener dispute).
279. See U.S., Mexican Sweetener Industries Set for Fresh HFCS Talks Next
Week, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 21, 2004, at 19 (explaining Mexico's willingness
to cooperate and discuss the significance of the original NAFTA provisions); see
also U.S. Answers II, supra note 89, 79 (discussing that the United States and
Mexico had to agree on the appointment of panelists before the NAFTA Secretariat
could appoint panelists in the sugar dispute).
280. See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C (explaining that beet sugar,
HFCS, and cane sugar are like products and that HFCS and cane sugar are DCS
products; evaluating the tax differentials of the Mexican soft drink tax).
281. See discussion supra Part II.A (evaluating the physical characteristics, end-
uses, consumer preferences, channels of distribution, and tariff classifications of
HFCS and cane sugar).
282. See discussion supra Part II.B (noting that the DCS products standard
depends on market competitiveness).
283. See discussion supra Part II.C (finding that the HFCS tax exemptions
create a market advantage for the domestic industry).
284. See discussion supra Part II.D (asserting that NAFTA is not provisionally
justified under Article XX(d) nor does it satisfy the chapeau of Article XX).
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In order to satisfy its Article III obligations, Mexico must revise or
eliminate the HFCS tax with regard to soft drinks and beverages.285
With these changes in place, the United States and Mexico will be
more likely to resolve their long-running sweetener dispute under
NAFTA 2
86
285. See discussion supra Part III (recommending that the Mexican government
revise or eliminate its tax laws to conform with its national treatment obligations
under Article 111:2).
286. See discussion supra Part III (recommending that the United States allow
for the appointment of NAFTA panelists).
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